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CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE TERRORISM 
PREVENTION PARADIGM: THE GUILT BY 
ASSOCIATION CRITIQUE 
Robert M. Chesney* 
TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES 
IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY. By David Cole and James X 
Dempsey. New York: The New Press. 2d ed. 2002. Pp. xvii, 231 .  Paper, 
$16.95. 
ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
FREEDOMS IN THE w AR ON TERRORISM. By David Cole. New York: 
The New Press. 2003. Pp. xiii, 315.  Cloth, $24.95. 
[T/he Department must shift its primary focus from investigating and 
prosecuting past crimes to identifying threats of future terrorist acts, 
preventing them from happening, and punishing would-be perpetrators for 
their plans of terror. 
- Attorney General John Ashcroft, Nov. 8, 20011 
[W]e all know that the way we treat you is the measure of our own 
liberties. 
- United States District Judge William Young to "shoe bomber" 
Richard Reid, Jan. 31, 20032 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Faysal Galab is a twenty-seven-year-old American citizen of 
Yemeni descent who was born and raised in Buffalo, New York.3 He is 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. B.S. 1994, Texas 
Christian; J.D. 1997, Harvard - Ed. I would like to thank Mike Green, David Logan, Mi­
chael Perry, Margaret Taylor, and Ron Wright for their invaluable comments and sugges­
tions. I welcome comments and criticisms at rchesney@law.wfu.edu. 
I. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to Heads of the Components 
of the Department of Justice (Nov. 8, 20Cl ) [hereinafter Ashcroft Memorandum], available 
at http:www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/1 l/ag-memo-110801.html. 
2. Tavia Smith, Shoe Bomber Richard Reid to Serve Life Sentence for Trying to Blow up 
an Airplane, NPR MORNING EDITION, Jan. 31, 2003, 2003 WL 4856067. 
3. Except as otherwise indicated, the following account derives from United States v. 
Goba, 240 F. Supp. 2d 242 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (relating substance of Galab's plea agreement); 
United Stales v. Goba, 220 F. Supp. 2d 182 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) [hereinafter Goba !]; Plea 
Agreement, United States v. Mosed, No. 02-CR-214-S (W.D.N.Y. 2002) [hereinafter Mosed 
1408 
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married, has three children, and used to run a gas station in the 
Buffalo suburb of Lackawanna. Perhaps you have heard of him; he 
will be spending some or all of the next ten years in federal prison 
because in the spring of 2001 he and six other Lackawanna residents 
traveled to Afghanistan and trained with Al Qaeda.4 
Their journey began on April 28, 2001 , when Galab and two com­
panions flew from New York to Lahore, Pakistan, purportedly in 
order to pursue religious studies. But Galab and his companions did 
not remain in Pakistan, let alone immerse themselves in peaceful 
religious studies. Instead, they traveled to Quetta, a town near the 
Afghan border, and from there crossed into Afghanistan. Eventually 
the men arrived at a camp funded by Osama bin Ladin known as 
al Farooq,5 where they commenced training in a variety of weapons 
and military skills. Among other things, Galab trained with explosives 
and learned to assemble and operate Kalashnikov assault rifles, 9mm 
handguns, M16 assault rifles, and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. 
His curriculum also included a lecture component: at some point in 
May, bin Ladin himself addressed the trainees regarding the virtues of 
armed struggl� against the United States and Israel. At another point, 
we are told, bin Ladin asked one of the Lackawanna men whether any 
Americans might be willing to die in Al Qaeda's service. 
In the summer of 2001, the men returned to the United States and 
resumed their quiet lives in Lackawanna. The FBI, alerted to their 
activities in Afghanistan, watched and wondered. Were they an Al 
Qaeda sleeper cell, awaiting orders to carry out unspeakable acts? Or 
were they merely foolish adventurers whose religious convictions had 
led them unwittingly and temporarily into Al Qaeda's company? 
Months passed by, and in the absence of evidence indicating an intent 
to engage in any specific criminal act, the FBI was left with no option 
but to watch, wait, a�d worry.6 Or so it seemed. 
Plea Agreement]; Plea Agreement, United States v. Gaba, No. 02-CR-214-S (W.D.N.Y. 
2002) (hereinafter Goha Plea Agreement]; Matthew Purdy & Lowell Bergman, Unclear 
Danger: Inside the Lackawanna Terror Case,.N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2003, at Al; and Tatsha 
Robertson, Trip By Buffalo Suspects Billed as Pilgrimage, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 21 , 2002, at 
A3. 
4. According to an affidavit from an FBI agent associated with the investigation, an 
unnamed eighth Lackawanna resident separately attended the Afghanistan training camp. 
See Affidavit of Special Agent Edward J. Needham at 'll'll 8, 24, United States v. Elbaneh, 
No. 02-M-111 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2002). 
5. According to Bruce Hoffman of the Rand Corporation and Rohan Gunaratna of the 
University of Scotland, al Farooq was a mixed-use training facility at the time. Hoffman es­
timates that over the years "al Farooq trained some 70,000 persons in basic military skills in 
connection with the Afghan civil war, and some 7,000 more in 'advanced terrorist training' 
for other purposes." See Jane Mayer, Lost in the Jihad, NEW YORKER, Mar. 10, 2003, at 50, 
53. 
6. "Almost from the day the [USA PATRIOT Act] was signed in October, these defen­
dants' phone conversations, financial and travel records, and e-mails had been relentlessly 
and secretly examined by FBI agents, after they had obtained a warrant from the special na-
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The approach of the first anniversary of September 1 1th prompted 
administration officials to become increasingly concerned about the 
risk of additional terrorist attacks in the United States, and the 
administration's attention naturally focused on those individuals -
like the men from Lackawanna - who the government knew had 
trained in bin Ladin's camps.7 And although the FBI had the men 
under surveillance, officials were keenly aware that there might be no 
affirmative sign of their intentions until it was too late to intervene. 
The September 11th hijackers, after all, had not manifested their 
illegal intentions until they stood up in the aisle of the doomed planes. 
Accordingly, top administration officials - possibly including the 
President himself - directed the FBI to take preventive action.8 
Galab and his companions were promptly arrested,9 but not on 
charges of conspiracy to commit a terrorist act; instead they were 
charged with providing "material support" to a designated foreign ter­
rorist organization ("DFTO") in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.10 
Section 2339B, once little known and rarely employed, has rapidly 
emerged as a central element of the government's post-9/11 terrorism 
prevention paradigm.1 1  Its popularity flows primarily from the fact that 
it chokes off the flow of cash, weapons, and other resources to 
DFTOs, thus hampering their ability to engage in violence. In this 
tional security court." Steven Brill, After: How America Confronted the Sept. 12 Era, 
NEWSWEEK, Mar. JO, 2003, at 66, 71; see also Scot J. Paltrow, U.S. Exerts Unusual Pressure 
On Group of Terror Suspects, WALL ST. J . ,  Apr. l, 2003 at AS (citing a former senior FBI 
official involved in the investigation for the proposition that "secret surveillance revealed no 
sign that the men had any hostile intent"). 
7. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet believed at the time that Galab and his 
fellows were " 'the most dangerous bunch inside the United States.' " Toni Locy & Kevin 
Johnson, How U.S. Watches Terrorist Suspects; Lackwanna Case Helped Shape FBl's Strat­
egy of Operation After 9111: Shortened Investigations, Quick Arrests, USA TODAY, Feb. 12, 
2003, at Al. At least some FBI analysts disputed the CIA's assessment. See Purdy & Berg­
man, supra note 3. 
8. Brill, supra note 6, at 71 (describing Ashcroft's "frustration" that the only crime with 
which the Lackawanna men could be charged was § 2339B); Locy & Johnson, supra note 7. 
9. One of the Lackawanna trainees - Jaber Elbaneh - remains at large. See Purdy & 
Bergman, supra note 3. 
JO. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(l) (2000). The material support statute incorporates by refer­
ence § 219(a)(l) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which empowers the Secretary of 
State to designate any group as a foreign terrorist organization upon finding three criteria 
satisfied: (1) the organization is foreign; (2) the organization engages in terrorism as defined 
in various statutes; and (3) such terrorism "threatens the security of United States nationals 
or the national security of the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(l) (incorporated by refer­
ence in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(6) (2000)). 
11 .  See Eric Lichtblau, A Seldom-Used Statute Becomes the Justice Department's Anti/er­
ror Weapon of Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, at B15. Attorney General Ashcroft has 
explained that "the central thrust of our campaign against terror must be proactive preven­
tion and disruption, and not primarily reactive investigation and prosecution. We cannot 
wait for terrorists to strike to begin investigations and make arrests. We must prevent first 
and prosecute second." Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note l. 
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respect, § 2339B functions much like an embargo on foreign terrorist 
groups. But the material support law turns out to have an additional 
capacity for prevention, one that raises thorny constitutional issues. A 
careful review of the manner in which the government interprets the 
phrase "material support" suggests that the statute could in some 
circumstances be used to punish membership in a DFTO, regardless of 
whether the member intends to facilitate, or even knows of, any illegal 
purpose of the group. Can this be squared with First Amendment 
protections for freedom of expression and association? Keeping in 
mind the Lackawanna example and the lessons of September 1 1th, can 
we afford a less aggressive approach? 
Similar questions have arisen with respect to many aspects of the 
terrorism prevention paradigm, igniting a passionate debate among 
scholars and commentators arguing from both the civil liberties and 
national security perspectives. Into this debate come not one, but two 
timely and important books by Professor David Cole of Georgetown 
University Law Center.12 The earlier of the two is Terrorism and 
the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National 
Security ("Terrorism"),13 which Cole coauthored with James X. 
Dempsey of the Center for Democracy and Technology.14 Terrorism 
and the Constitution takes aim at the war on terrorism in its 
early stages, reflecting developments through the end of 2001. Writing 
alone in the second book, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and 
Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism ("Enemy Aliens"), 
Cole brings these criticisms up to date through the summer of 2003. 
In a: narrow sense, these books focus on distinct issues. In 
Terrorism and the Constitution, Cole and Dempsey argue that the gov­
ernment was overreacting to the threat of terrorism at the expense of 
civil liberties even prior to 9111,  and that the subsequent war on ter­
rorism has exacerbated this problem. To illustrate the point, the 
authors focus primarily on the authority of the FBI to engage in 
12. Cole is a prolific author and advocate with respect to civil liberties and immigration 
law issues, and in recent months he has emerged as one of the most prominent critics of the 
legal front in the war on terrorism. See, e.g. , David Cole, Their Liberties, Our Security: De­
mocracy and Double Standards, BOSTON REV., Oct./Nov. 2002, at 4. 
13. The 2002 edition of Terrorism supersedes a first edition which appeared in 1999. 
JAMES X. DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING 
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (lst ed. 1999). The events of Sep­
tember 1 1th, and resulting government actions undertaken in the name of enhanced security, 
naturally warranted a reexamination of the arguments set forth in the original edition, and 
although the second edition retains substantially all of the material from the first, it also pro­
vides a new chapter and expanded conclusion focusing on the USA PATRIOT Act and re­
lated post-9/11 antiterrorism measures. 
14. "Since the early 1990s, [Jim Dempsey] has been one of the leading watchdogs of FBI 
surveillance initiatives, a reasoned and respected civil liberties advocate routinely sum­
moned to the Hill by both political parties to advise lawmakers about technology and pri­
vacy issues." Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Six Weeks in Autumn, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2002 
(Magazine), at 6, 6. 
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national security investigations and the resulting capacity for political 
suppression. Enemy Aliens has a broader scope, focusing on the 
impact of the war on terrorism - and prior periods of national secu­
rity concern - on noncitizens. Cole argues that in times of crisis our 
society tends to sacrifice the rights of noncitizens in the politically 
convenient but ultimately futile hope of increasing security for all, and 
that such deprivations in turn become precedents for extending like 
treatment to citizens at a later date. 15  
Notwithstanding these differences, the books are united by a 
common understanding of our society's treatment of civil liberties in 
past times of national security crisis. Each describes a historical cycle 
of civil liberties abuse during such periods, but with an important twist 
on the traditional narrative: repressive measures do not merely resur­
face from time to time, but rather they evolve to circumvent norms, 
precedents, and institutional-civil-liberties protections erected after 
past abuses were recognized and regretted. I term this evolutionary 
perspective the adaptive-learning model. It provides the lens through 
which the authors in both books survey and critique many of the 
antiterrorism laws and policies adopted in recent years. 
In Part II below, I locate the adaptive-learning model among 
various perspectives offered by scholars who have examined the 
performance of government with respect to civil liberties under crisis 
or emergency conditions. Against that backdrop, Parts III and IV set 
forth in broad strokes the specific critiques of antiterrorism law 
provided in Terrorism and the Constitution and Enemy Aliens, respec­
tively. Part V then concludes with a close analysis of an argument 
which plays a significant role in both books and which is representa­
tive of the adaptive-learning theme: the claim that the law prohibiting 
material support to designated foreign terrorist organizations resur­
rects the unconstitutional principle of guilt by association (Terrorism, 
pp. 121-23; Enemy Aliens, pp. 58-64). I conclude that this claim is 
significantly overstated in most - but not all - circumstances, and 
that it therefore provides only limited support for the adaptive­
learning model. 
Ultimately, however, one does not have to accept the adaptive­
learning model to appreciate the tremendous contribution Cole and 
Dempsey make in these books. They draw needed attention to the 
unique vulnerabilities of noncitizens; they raise difficult questions 
about a range of antiterrorism measures; and the stories they relate 
put a human face on the abstract concept of civil liberties. Our 
national debate can only be improved as a result. 
15. Many of these ideas first appeared, in abbreviated form, in David Cole, Enemy 
Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002) [hereinafter Cole, Enemy Aliens], and David Cole, The 
New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terror, 38 HARV. C. R.-C. L. L. REV. 1 
(2003) [hereinafter Cole, The New McCarthyism]. 
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II. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CALIBRATION ERRORS 
Conventional wisdom holds that during times of crisis the balance 
between liberty and security shifts in favor of the latter. 16 Although 
not without its difficulties,17 this claim is broadly consistent with 
historical experience, 18 and has some support in recent empirical 
work.19 But the naked fact of a change in the balance between liberty 
and security, without more, tells us nothing about whether society is 
better or worse off as a result. One cannot assume, after all, that "the 
legal baseline prior to the emergency . . .  already embodies the optimal 
balance between liberty and security."20 It may be the case that the 
status quo ante delivered too little security, or that in light of changed 
circumstances the prior balance is no longer appropriate.21 Accord­
ingly, whether a calibration error has occurred in any particular case 
- i.e., whether the balance between liberty and security has been 
struck poorly - requires closer analysis. 
16. See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be 
Constitutional? 1 1 2  YALE L. J. 1011 ,  1019 (2003) ("Experience shows that when grave na­
tional crises are upon us, democratic nations tend to race to the bottom as far as the protec­
tion of human rights and civil liberties, indeed of basic and fundamental legal principles, is 
concerned."); Rodney A. Smolla, Terrorism and the Bill of Rights, 10 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J.  551, 573-74 (2002); see also Floyd Abrams, The First Amendment and the War Against 
Terrorism, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 ,  10-11 (2002); Thomas E. Baker, At  War with Civil Rights 
and Civil Liberties, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 219 (2002); Paul Finkelman, Civil Liberties 
and Civil War: The Great Emancipator as Civil Libertarian, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1353, 1362 
(1993) (reviewing MARKE. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND 
CIVIL LIBERTIES (1991)) (stating that "if truth is the first casualty of wartime, then civil lib­
erties is surely the second" (internal citation omitted)); Wendy Kaminer, False Security, 
BOSTON REV., Oct./Nov. 2002, at 20. 
17. The notion of a zero-sum balance between liberty and security with respect to a 
given policy choice falsely assumes a "one-dimensional policy space." Eric A. Posner & 
Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) 
(manuscript at 6, on file with author). In reality, policy changes may have varying impacts 
along multiple dimensions, decreasing liberty in some respects and increasing it in others. 
See id. (providing an example with respect to airport security screening). The "interdepend­
ence of budgeting choices that affect rights," moreover, further confounds claims about the 
impact of a given policy on individual rights. Id. (manuscript at 6-7) (pointing out that in­
creased financing for one rights-enhancing policy may entail a decrease for another). 
18. See, e.g., ZECHARIA CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (reprint 
ed., Lawbook Exchange 2001) (1941) (discussing conflicts between liberty and security in 
American history); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING 
PRIVILEGE": STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000) 
(same); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 
(1998) (describing security measures taken at the expense of civil liberties in the context of 
various crises). 
19. See Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Silence During War 2 (unpublished manuscript) 
(finding that "when the country is at war, the probability that the U.S. Supreme Court will 
vote to uphold a civil rights or civil liberties claim drops by about 15 percent"), available at 
http://gking.harvard.edu/files/crisis.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2003). 
20. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 17 (manuscript at 12). 
21. See id. (manuscript at 12-13) (noting argument that intelligence agencies were 
unduly restrained prior to 9/1 1 ). 
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In recent years, a number of scholars have addressed the issue of 
government policymaking under crisis or emergency conditions in an 
effort to facilitate that analysis. In this Part, I situate Cole and 
Dempsey's approach amidst these varying perspectives. 
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have recently observed that 
accounts of decisionmaking in a crisis context often accord a central 
role to one of two dynamics: the impact of fear, and the impact of past 
instances in which liberty gave way to security interests.22 Both tradi­
tions exert an influence on Terrorism and the Constitution and Enemy 
Aliens, but Cole and Dempsey blend and extrapolate from them in a 
manner which produces their own unique - and markedly pessimistic 
- perspective. 
Consider fear. The proposition behind the fear dynamic is that fear 
will tend to distort policymaking under crisis conditions by interfering 
with judgment and thus increasing the risk of a calibration error with 
respect to liberty-security tradeoffs.23 In this account, fear may cause 
decisionmakers either to overestimate the scope of the security 
threat,24 to underestimate the value of the civil liberties at stake,25 or 
both. 
On the security side of the ledger, the most extreme form of the 
fear argument involves the sociological concept of moral panic.26 A 
moral panic is said to exist when a "condition, episode, person, or 
group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal 
values and interests," and "its nature is presented in a stylized and 
stereotypical fashion by the mass media and politicians. "27 As Eliza-
22. See id. (manuscript at 3-4) (identifying these two traditions as the primary arguments 
supporting the view that the constitution should be strictly rather than flexibly interpreted 
during emergencies). 
23. See id. (manuscript at 17-30). 
24. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 16, at 1038-42 (discussing cognitive limitations and biases 
relating to fear in the context of national emergency); W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhau­
ser, Sacrificing Civil Liberties to Reduce Terrorism Risks, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 99, 
100 (2003) (assessing emerging empirical evidence that "(t]he extraordinary publicity given 
to the [9/11] attack and the accompanying losses produced the kind of risk that people are 
likely to severely misestimate in the future"). 
25. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985) (discussing tendency to underestimate value of civil liberties in 
emergency context). 
26. There have been few claims that 9/11 produced moral panic conditions. See Nicole 
Rogers & Aidan Ricketts, Fear of Freedom: Anti-Terrorism Laws and the Challenge to Aus­
tralian Democracy, 2002 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 149, 163 (2002) (arguing that a moral panic 
has ensued in Australia as a result of the 9/11 attacks, providing "an opportunity for the 
Government to justify a far reaching attack upon the civil and political liberties of the Aus­
tralian public"); cf. Daniel M. Filler, Terrorism, Panic, and Pedophilia, 10 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y 
& L. 345, 367-69 (arguing that the initial reaction to 9/11 contained elements of a moral 
panic directed at Muslims). 
27. STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS 9 (1972); see also ERICH 
GOODE & NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, MORAL PANICS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
DEVIANCE (1994). 
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beth Scott and Laurence Steinberg recently explained in another 
context, a moral panic includes the following elements: "an intense 
community concern (often triggered by a publicized incident) that is 
focused on deviant behavior, an exaggerated perception of the 
seriousness of the threat and the number of offenders, and collective 
hostility toward the offenders, who are perceived as outsiders threat­
ening the community."28 Because one of the defining elements of a 
moral panic is overestimation of danger, the label carries with it the 
conclusion that legal or policy changes driven by moral panic are 
inherently ill-considered. 
Fear need not rise to the level of moral panic, however, to contrib­
ute to a calibration error based on faulty assessments of danger.29 The 
literature of cognitive bias is relevant here. As Oren Gross has argued, 
a number of cognitive biases or limitations interfere with risk assess­
ments in the crisis context, particularly where terrorism is involved.30 
The "availability heuristic," for example, suggests that one's estimate 
of the probability of an event may be inflated by one's "ability to 
imagine similar events taking place," a process that since 9/11 can be 
expected to boost estimates of the likelihood of additional terrorist 
attacks in America.31 Similarly, "[p]rospect theory suggests that indi­
viduals tend to give excessive weight to low-probability results when 
the stakes are high enough and the outcomes are particularly bad," a 
dynamic which may function with particular force when the feared 
harm "involves not merely a serious loss, but one that produces 
particularly strong emotions."32 Recent empirical work provides some 
28. Elizabeth Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEXAS L. REV. 799, 807 
(2003); see also MICHAEL WELCH, DETAINED: IMMIGRATION LAWS AND THE EXPANDING 
I.N.S. JAIL COMPLEX 9-34 (using a moral panic model to discuss concern over immigration 
in the 1990's). 
29. The fear model assumes that the impact of fear on decisionmaking is, on the whole, 
negative. That assumption, however, overlooks the complexities of the relationship between 
fear and cognition. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 17 (manuscript ·at 19-30) (providing a 
nuanced account of this relationship in the course of rejecting the view that fear necessarily 
produces ill-considered policy). 
30. See Gross, supra note 16, at 1038-42. 
31. Id. at 1039 (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 1 1  
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); and Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, A vailability: 
A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973)); see 
also Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 121, 
1 21 (2003) [hereinafter Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect] (discussing the impact 
of the availability heuristic on terrorism-risk assessment). 
32. Gross, supra note 16, at 1040-41 (citing Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Pros­
pect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 17  
(20Cll ); Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 1 1 2  YALE 
L.J. 61, 66 (2002); and Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 1 15 HARV. L. REV. 1 119, 1137-
44 (2002) (book review)); see also Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect, supra note 
31,  at 121-22 (discussing impact of affect-rich probabilities). 
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support for these arguments,33 although there also is reason to be 
cautious in extrapolating from these points.34 
On the liberties side of the ledger, Vincent Blasi has argued that 
crisis conditions can prompt policymakers to systematically under­
value civil liberties - particularly those allowing for political dissent.35 
Blasi describes a "pathology" that takes hold under crisis conditions, a 
"social phenomenon, characterized by a notable shift in attitudes 
regarding the tolerance of unorthodox ideas. What makes a period 
pathological is the existence of certain dynamics that radically increase 
the likelihood that people who hold unorthodox views will be 
punished for what they say or believe."36 In many if not most 
instances, a period of pathology is triggered and defined by the 
perception of a serious security threat, as in the case of communism 
during the Red Scare and in the McCarthy era. When crafting First 
Amendment doctrine, Blasi wrote, we should anticipate the rigors our 
First Amendment values might face during the next pathological 
cycle.37 Some commentators have suggested that we are, or at least 
were, in the midst of a pathological moment in the wake of 9/11 .38 
The concept of fear as a distorting influence on both sides of the 
ledger is significant throughout both Terrorism and the Constitution 
and Enemy Aliens, but Cole and Dempsey make use of the concept in 
distinctive fashion. In their account, the important factor is not how 
33. See Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 24, at 108-16 (discussing biases impacting risk 
beliefs relating to terrorism); cf Baruch Fischhoff et al., J11dged Terror Risk and Proximity to 
the World Trade Center, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 137, 147-48 (2003) (discussing the 
impact of proximity to the World Trade Center (and of emotional state) on risk estimates 
relating to the probability of injury in a future terrorist attack). 
34. Given the likelihood that many Americans underestimated the probability of a ter­
rorist attack occurring in America prior to 9/1 1 ,  it is an open question whether the upward 
impact of 9/11 on estimates of future attacks has functioned as a distortion or, instead, as a 
corrective. Cf Posner & Vermeule, s11pra note 17 (manuscript at 2 1-29) (discussing offset­
ting benefits of fear, including its ability to spur action from complacency). 
35. See Blasi, supra note 25. 
36. Id. at 450. The proposition that episodes of pathology arise periodically in response 
to perceived emergency conditions raises an important question: Can the government artifi­
cially prolong a perceived state of emergency in order to sustain the increased freedom of 
action it enjoys as a result? See Jules Lobel, The War on Terrorism and Civil Liberties, 63 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 767, 772-82 (2002) (asserting that the government has sustained a perpetual 
state of emergency with respect to a succession of threats including, most recently, terror­
ism). But see Posner & Vermeule, s11pra note 17 (manuscript at 6-12) (denying the existence 
of a "statist ratchet" pattern in which successive emergencies produce continuous expansion 
of government power at the expense of civil liberties). 
37. See Blasi, s11pra note 25, at 459. Professor Blasi purposefully wrote with respect to 
the First Amendment alone, see id. at 457, but an argument can be made that his points ap­
ply to an extent to other constitutional values such as due process of law and privacy. 
38. See Howard M. Wasserman, Symbolic Co11nter-Speech, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 4, on file with author); Kathleen K. Olson, Courtroom 
Access After 9111: A Pathological Perspective, 7 COMM. L. & POLICY 461 , 462 ("Civil liber­
tarians agree that the nation finds itself in the midst of pathological times."). 
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fear impacts well-intentioned decisionmakers but, instead, how it im­
pacts the public to which government officials might have to answer.39 
Put another way, the main issue in their view is not whether fear will 
cause well-intentioned officials to make mistakes but instead whether 
fear will cause the public to tolerate overreaching by the government. 
And as Cole relates in Enemy Aliens, public fear during times of crisis 
in our history often focuses on outsiders, particularly noncitizens.40 As 
a result, Cole contends, government overreaching that impinges 
largely or primarily on the interests of noncitizens - the "other" -
ordinarily is tolerated by citizens (Enemy Aliens, pp. 18, 72, 81-82). 
The other major tradition influencing Cole and Dempsey's work is 
the proposition that past events in the cycle of tension between liberty 
and security have a lasting impact on the outcome of future events in 
that cycle. Mark Tushnet, for example, has described a process of "so­
cial learning" in which the recognition of past calibration errors tends 
to reduce the likelihood of comparable errors in the future.41 "Know­
ing that government officials in the past have in fact exaggerated 
threats to national security or have taken actions that were ineffective 
with respect to the threats that actually were present," Tushnet argues, 
"we have become increasingly skeptical about contemporary claims 
regarding those threats, with the effect that the scope of proposed 
government responses to threats has decreased."42 
This learned skepticism manifests itself in a variety of liberty­
protecting forms. Most obviously, there are judicial precedents and 
institutional safeguards within government itself that function as 
bulwarks protecting individual rights. Equally if not more important, 
the social-learning process generates watchdogging behavior by the 
media and public interest groups. Finally, socialization sensitizes the 
39. ENEMY ALIENS, pp. 7, 48; TERRORISM, p. 1 13; cf Sunstein, Terrorism and Probabil­
ity Neglect, supra note 31, at 129-31 (discussing political ramifications of public fear based on 
overestimates of risk). 
40. ENEMY ALIENS, pp. 85-87. In this respect Cole's approach is akin to a relaxed ver­
sion of the moral panic concept, which similarly emphasizes outsider status. See supra notes 
26-28 and accompanying text. 
41. See Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu? Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 
2003 WIS. L. REV. 273, 283. 
42. Id. at 283-84; see also Eric Muller, Inference or Impact? Racial Profiling and the In­
ternment's True Legacy, OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 29, 33, on 
file with author) (discussing "firebreaks" in the "legal landscape" which might operational­
ize social learning from past mistakes in balancing liberty and security); Eric Muller, 1217 
and 9111: War, Liberties, and the Lessons of History, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 571, 587, 591, 
(2002) (arguing, with respect to measures pertaining to race and ethnicity only, that the Ad­
ministration's post-9/11 policies reflect "a premise of moderation" that can be attributed in 
part to a "change in the legitimacy of racial and ethnic assumptions in our policymaking" 
since the time of the Second World War); Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tri­
bunals and Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENTARY 
261, 262 (2002) (similar). But see Posner and Vermeule, supra note 17 (manuscript at 14) 
(criticizing the "libertarian ratchet" concept). 
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public - and especially lawyers - to the potential for calibration 
errors. The net impact is to increase and entrench restraints on the 
government's freedom of action. The social-learning model accord­
ingly predicts that the recognition of calibration errors from, say, the 
Cold War era will prevent repetition of those errors on the same scale 
during, say, the current wave of concern over terrorism. 
Cole and Dempsey accept that our society has a history of commit­
ting calibration errors that are recognized as such and regretted after 
the fact (Terrorism, pp. 71-89; Enemy Aliens, pp. 88-158). But they do 
not appear to accept the social-learning model. On the contrary, the 
primary historical trend emphasized in Enemy Aliens is the govern­
ment's purported tendency to eventually extend to citizens those 
rights-depriving measures that are established initially with respect to 
noncitizens (Enemy Aliens, pp. 85-87). To the extent that government 
action is recognized as a mistake, in this view, we can expect to see the 
government evolve in order to circumvent any entrenched civil liberty 
protections that are created as a result. As Cole has stated the point 
elsewhere, the "war on terrorism has already demonstrated our gov­
ernment's remarkable ability to evolve its tactics in ways that allow it 
simultaneously to repeat history and to insist that it is not repeating 
history . . . .  A historical comparison reveals not so much a repudiation 
as an evolution of political repression. "43 In this model, which I refer to 
as the adaptive-learning model, the social-learning ratchet is ineffec­
tive at best and at worst lulls us into a false sense that our civil liberties 
are not at stake. The adaptive-learning model in this sense lies at the 
heart of both Terrorism and the Constitution and Enemy Aliens. 
III. TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: WATCHING THE 
WATCHERS 
In Terrorism and the Constitution, Cole and Dempsey's primary 
concern is the scope of the FBI's national security investigative 
authority. In the past, they explain, this authority was the root of grave 
civil liberties violations as the FBI used muscular and intrusive inves­
tigations expressly to disrupt First Amendment activity by politically 
disfavored groups and individuals. After an interim period of reform, 
the authors warn, the threat of similar abuse has reemerged recently in 
a more subtle form due to changes in the law generated by fear of 
terrorism (Terrorism, p. 178) . 
. The argument begins with a survey of historical abuses of the FBI's 
investigative powers. In this vein, the authors relate not just the 
familiar stories of the McCarthy and Vietnam eras - this they do with 
engaging details relating to less-well-known victims of aggressive 
43. Cole, The New McCarthyism, supra note 15, at 1-2. 
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investigations, such as Frank Wilkinson - but also the deeper history 
of the FBl's role as the lead agency for national security and intelli­
gence investigations within the United States (Terrorism, pp. 71-89). 
We may never have had a pure domestic intelligence service along 
the lines of the United Kingdom's MIS service,44 but the responsibili­
ties which would fall to such an agency (counterintelligence, counter­
espionage, and counterterrorism) nonetheless have been with us for 
quite some time and have been in the FBl's bailiwick since its incep­
tion. Cole and Dempsey shed much light on these early days, empha­
sizing the efforts by Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone to confine 
the Bureau to crime-related investigations and the subsequent 
reemergence of noncriminal national security investigations in connec­
tion with the threats posed by fascism and communism (Terrorism, pp. 
71-72). We read about J. Edgar Hoover and the subversion investiga­
tions, of course, and witness the FBl's use of its investigative powers 
to disrupt or discredit targets such as Martin Luther King, Jr. ,  and 
leaders of the Vietnam War protest movement (Terrorism, pp. 72-76). 
It all came to a head, famously, in the post-Watergate congres­
sional investigation headed by Senator Frank Church (Terrorism, p. 
76). With public revelations of investigative abuses came public out­
rage, and with public outrage came political pressure to prevent fur­
ther abuses. At this crucial juncture, Attorney General Edward Levi 
stepped in with two sets of new internal guidelines meant to constrain 
the FBI and thus forestall a legislative effort to do the same.45 
The first set dealt with the investigation of security threats 
(including terrorism) of a purely domestic nature, requiring that the 
FBI have an indication of possible criminal conduct before initiating a 
preliminary inquiry in such cases.46 In the event the potential target 
was a group advocating social or political change, moreover, Levi's 
domestic guidelines would permit a full-fledged investigation to open 
only if agents had "specific and articulable facts" indicating that the 
group planned to achieve its ends through illegal means; mere suspi­
cion was not enough to move beyond a preliminary inquiry.47 A 
44. We may yet. See, e.g. , WILLIAM E. ODOM, FIXING INTELLIGENCE: FOR A MORE 
SECURE AMERICA (2003) (recommending creation of a national counterintelligence serv­
ice); A Review of the Relationship Between a Department of Homeland Security and the In­
telligence Community: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Gov't Aft., 107th Cong. 22 
(2002) (testimony of Lt. Gen. William Odom, U.S. Army, ret.) (same). 
45. See THE FBI: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE GUIDE 38 (Athan G. Theoharis et 
al. eds., 1999). 
46. See THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON DOMESTIC SECURITY . 
INVESTIGATIONS (1976), reprinted in FBI Statutory Charter: Hearings on S. 1612 Before the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 18-26 (1978). 
47. See THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at § 1; John T. Elliff, 
The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI Investigations, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 785, 798 
(1984). 
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second set, which was classified, dealt with the same issues in the con­
text of security and intelligence investigations concerning the activities 
of foreign powers.48 
Developments at the federal level were paralleled, moreover, at 
the local level. In a series of civil suits, plaintiffs in major cities such as 
New York, San Francisco, and Chicago challenged the intelligence­
gathering activities of local police. These suits resulted in consent 
decrees or even local ordinances that in various ways prohibited local 
law enforcement from monitoring or otherwise collecting and main­
taining information in the absence of criminal suspicion.49 
The passage of time dulled the reform spirit while bringing to light 
new security threats, however, and pressure soon mounted to slacken 
the restrictions imposed by the Levi guidelines.50 In 1983 Attorney 
General William French Smith revised the domestic guidelines some­
what by replacing the "specific and articulable" standard with a 
"reasonably indicated" test and, equally significantly, by authorizing 
investigations to be opened based on a target's statements advocating 
criminal activity or otherwise indicating the possibility of crime.51 
According to the authors, the Guidelines were further weakened in 
the aftermath of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing when the Justice 
Department circulated an internal memorandum emphasizing that the 
reasonable-indication standard for opening a full investigation is "sub­
stantially lower than probable cause" and that a preliminary investiga­
tion could be opened on a lesser showing (Terrorism, p. 82). 
Cole and Dempsey conclude from this review that the "history of 
the FBI has been one of an ongoing struggle between control and 
discretion, between efforts to limit monitoring of political dissent and 
efforts to preserve or extend FBI powers" (Terrorism, p. 89). And to 
buttress this conclusion, the authors provide a series of lengthy 
vignettes from more recent years.52 The vignettes are meant to show 
48. See Athan G. Theoharis, FBI Surveillance: Past and Present, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 
883, 889 (1 984) (citing JOHN T. ELLIFF, THE REFORM OF FBI INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 
l33 (1979)). 
49. TERRORISM, pp. 86-87, 95-98; see, e.g. , Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 273 F. Supp. 
2d 327, 329-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (describing the history of the consent decree governing po­
lice investigation of political activity in New York City). 
50. See THE FBI: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 45, at 40. 
51 .  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING 
ENTERPRISE AND DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS IJl.8.4.a (1983), reprinted in Press 
Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Mar. 7, 1983). Declassified portions of Smith's foreign coun­
terintelligence guidelines show that the factual predicate for such investigations was not the 
target's illegal behavior but, instead, its status as an agent of a foreign power. See 
ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND 
FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS, available at www.fas.org/irp/agency/ 
doj/fbi/terrorismintel2.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2003). 
52. Somewhat counterintuitively, the book actually opens with these vignettes and only 
afterward discusses the earlier history. 
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that even prior to what might be described as the age of terrorism {be­
ginning with the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995), the FBI was taking 
advantage of the slackening of restraints to engage in "security" inves­
tigations that served primarily to harass or suppress political oppo­
nents. In this spirit, we read of the FBI's vast but fruitless investigation 
in the 1980s of the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El 
Salvador ("CISPES"). Ronald Kessler has described the CISPES 
investigation as "the modern bureau's most embarrassing case,"53 and 
the authors' detailed account does much to explain why. The investi­
gation began appropriately enough, with a tip from an informant 
suggesting that CISPES was under the direction and control of a 
Salvadoran rebel organization, and that its Dallas chapter intended to 
carry out terrorism in America. The resulting investigation, however, 
generated no corroboration for the tip. Yet the investigation contin­
ued for years and spread nationwide. Most problematically, the inves­
tigation consisted largely of monitoring perfectly legal but politically 
unpopular speech by CISPES members, accompanied by extensive 
file-keeping. Cole and Dempsey make a strong case that the investiga­
tion might have continued further had Congress not begun to ask 
questions about it in 1985.54 
We also learn of the so-called "L.A. Eight," a group of legal aliens 
and permanent residents who in the 1980s drew the FBI's attention as 
a result of their advocacy in support of the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine ("PFLP") (Terrorism, pp. 35-44). The proce­
dural history of the case is byzantine, but Cole knows it well, having 
been counsel to the "Eight" in connection with the government's 
numerous efforts to deport them.55 Their story is a good introduction 
to the ways in which the immigration laws can be used to take action 
against noncitizens on the basis of First Amendment activities. In 
furtherance of this point, the authors emphasize the PFLP's social and 
political functions but, surprisingly, the PFLP's history of terrorist 
violence gets extremely short shrift (Terrorism, pp. 40-41) .56 Nonethe­
less, the core lesson of the L.A. Eight story remains: the government 
53. RONALD KESSLER, THE FBI 140 (1993). 
54. TERRORISM. pp. 21-33. For another assessment which places the CISPES investiga­
tion in context with the First Amendment concerns raised by the FBI's investigative powers, 
see PHI LIP  B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA: A COMMONSENSE STRATEGY FOR A 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 147-51 (1998). 
55. See R. Jeffrey Smith, Patriot Act Used in 16-year-old Deportation Case; Administra­
tion Revives 1987 Effort, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2003, at A3 (describing renewed efforts to 
deport two of the eight). 
56. The PFLP rose to prominence as a result of terrorist attacks it committed in the 
1970s. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 2001 , at 104. It has 
become more active recently, as indicated by the assassination of an Israeli cabinet minister 
in 2001. See id.; Richard Beeston, Terrorism Focus on Syria After Assassination, TIMES 
(London), Oct. 18, 2001 , at 4. 
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can and does act against noncitizens on the basis of otherwise pro­
tected First Amendment activities.57 
These and other vignettes from the 1980s and early 1990s do tend 
to cast the FBI's investigative practices in a negative light, but not one 
at all comparable to the abuses which took place in the prereform era 
under Hoover. On the other hand, the 1980s and early 1990s were 
relatively calm periods from the perspective of national security. And 
today things are different. Beginning in the mid-1990s, and especially 
since 9/11, the threat of terrorism in America has provided a powerful 
justification for additional government action to enhance security. 
The authors are aware of this, of course, and accordingly devote 
the final third of the book to an exploration of how civil liberties have 
faired in the age of terrorism. At this point the book's focus expands 
considerably, no longer dealing exclusively with the subset of civil lib­
erty concerns raised by the FBI's investigative powers. Instead, Cole 
and Dempsey provide a sweeping critical survey of antiterrorism laws 
and policies that have been adopted since the Oklahoma City bomb­
ing in 1995 and 9/11 .  
The first wave of heightened fears about terrorism within 
the United States produced the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA").58 And of the AEDPA provisions 
discussed in Terrorism and the Constitution, none is more representa­
tive of the authors' concerns than the material support law, § 2339B.59 
As noted above, Cole and Dempsey contend that this law subtly resur­
rects the unconstitutional principle of guilt by association (Terrorism, 
pp. 108-109, 121-123). This is an important argument in terms of as­
sessing the merits of the adaptive-learning model. It is, after all, 
premised on the claim that the government is seeking to avoid a par­
ticular civil liberty protection generated during a prior time of height­
ened security concerns. For this reason, and also because the argu­
ment plays a central role in both Terrorism and the Constitution and in 
Enemy Aliens, I discuss the merits of the guilt by association critique 
in considerable detail in Part V. 
Section 2339B is not the only aspect of AEDPA that troubles Cole 
and Dempsey, however. They are equally concerned about the impact 
of AEDPA on the immigration laws. The authors emphasize, for 
example, what they describe as the resurrection of "ideological exclu-
57. In Enemy Aliens, this lesson becomes the premise for a warning - what the gov­
ernment has done to aliens it eventually will attempt to do to citizens. 
58. TERRORISM, pp. 1 13-15; see Pub. L. No. 104-132, 1 10  Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in 
scattered sections of the United States Code). 
59. Tying their critique of § 2339B to Terrorism's focus on FBI investigative powers, 
Cole and Dempsey point out that if § 2339B in fact criminalizes First Amendment activity 
then the FBI is affirmatively authorized thereby to investigate such activity despite past 
abuses. TERRORISM, pp. 122-23. 
May 2003) Civil Liberties and Terrorism Prevention 1423 
sion" (Terrorism, pp. 123-124) . Throughout the Cold War, they ex­
plain, the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 had authorized exclusion of 
aliens who were members of a communist organization.60 This anti­
membership provision had been repealed in 1990, but AEDPA rein­
stated it with "terrorist" substituting for "communist." To Cole and 
Dempsey, this change - like the adoption of § 2339B - resorts to 
guilt by association (Terrorism, pp. 123-125) .  
After assessing these and other aspects of AEDPA, Cole and 
Dempsey move their survey forward to confront the array of 
antiterrorism measures that have emerged since 9/11 .6 1  Their critique 
ranges widely, from the expansion of surveillance and investigative 
powers under the USA PATRIOT Act,62 to the immigration sweeps 
resulting in the detention of hundreds or perhaps thousands of Arab 
and Muslim noncitizens, to the shroud of secrecy thrown over many of 
these measures (Terrorism, pp. 151-174). The authors pay particular 
attention to the immigration measures in the USA PATRIOT Act, 
noting that these provisions expand the use of the material support 
concept to the deportation context, make advocacy of terrorism or a 
terrorist organization a basis for exclusion, and provide for detention 
of aliens pending removal based on the Attorney General's self­
declared reasonable suspicion that an alien may be a terrorist 
( Terrorism, pp. 153-158) .63 Cole and Dempsey also discuss the USA 
PATRIOT Act's expansion of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act ("PISA"), contending that by increasing the range of cases in 
which the FBI may resort to the PISA court for warrants - a proce­
dure requiring probable cause to believe the target is an agent of a 
foreign power, but not probable cause to believe a crime has been or is 
60. TERRORISM, pp. 123-25; see Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 
8 u.s.c. §§ 1101-1189). 
61 . This is significant because, while it would be difficult to make the case that 1996 was 
a pathological period in which overriding security concerns blinded legislators to traditional 
commitments to civil liberties, the immediate post-9111 environment arguably was different. 
62. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub.L. No. 107-56, 115  Stat. 272. Dempsey 
was among a coalition of civil liberties and privacy advocates intimately involved in the lob­
bying effort against the USA PATRIOT Act, as memorably related by Robert 0. Harrow, 
Jr., supra note 14. 
63. The detention measure may be superfluous in practice, as officials are able to rely on 
a combination of existing statutory authority and regulations promulgated after 9/11 to 
achieve the same end without requiring the Attorney General to certify his suspicion that 
the alien may be a terrorist. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2000); 
Review of Custody Determinations, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,909-02 (proposed Oct. 31, 2001) (to be 
codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3) (authorizing automatic stay of immigration judge's order of 
release, pending appeal by the government, in all cases in which the government denied 
release of the alien pending removal proceedings or where bond was set at $10,QOO or 
higher); Interim Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,334-35 (Sept. 17, 2001) (granting a "reasonable period 
of time" beyond forty-eight hours to make a detention determination in the event of an 
emergency). 
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about to be committed - the law necessarily increased the extent to 
which FBI investigations may interfere with First Amendment rights.64 
But there are other post-9/11 measures unrelated to the USA 
PATRIOT Act that also draw criticism. Chief among them is the 
arrest and detention of hundreds if not thousands of Arab and Muslim 
men in the aftermath of the attack. Combined with other measures 
such as the FBI's attempt to interview some 5000 men from certain 
Arab and Muslim countries, the authors see a pattern of ethnic and 
religious profiling which they contend cannot withstand strict scrutiny 
analysis under the Equal Protection Clause.65 Cole and Dempsey also 
contend that civil liberties in general have been degraded in a broad 
but subtle fashion by the administration's efforts to maintain secrecy 
with respect to many aspects of its antiterrorism efforts (Terrorism, 
pp. 172-174). 
At the conclusion of this survey, the authors shift the focus back to 
the narrower questions raised by the FBI's national-security investiga­
tive powers. Cole and Dempsey explain that in keeping with the 
historical patterns described earlier in the book, the antiterrorism 
measures of 1996 and 2001 "adopted a political approach to terrorism" 
(Terrorism, p. 187). The FBI, they conclude, "must get out of the busi­
ness of monitoring political activity and associations, foreign and 
domestic, and instead dedicate itself to the urgent task of identifying 
those planning violent activities" ( Terrorism, p. 187). The problem, of 
course, is that there are circumstances in which the task of identifying 
those planning violent activities would be advanced by monitoring 
expressive activity. Philip Heymann captured the tension well when he 
wrote that: 
[a] crucial protection for political dissent is the assurance that the gov­
ernment will not monitor private or public meetings of a group sharply 
criticizing the government. But when such groups urge violence as a re­
sponse to their criticisms, monitoring their membership and activities 
may be important to early discovery of extremely dangerous political 
violence.66 
64. TERRORISM, pp. 159-61. The assessment is not entirely negative, however. Cole and 
Dempsey acknowledge, for example, the propriety of the USA PA TRI OT Act provision 
that for the first-time grants the CIA limited access to grand jury information, although they 
object to the provision's lack of judicial oversight. TERRORISM, p. 162; see also Jennifer M. 
Collins, And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: Sharing Grand Jury Information With the 
Intelligence Community Under the USA PATRIOT Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261 (2002) 
(proposing additional record-keeping and ex ante judicial approval requirements). 
65. TERRORISM, pp. 168-71. For a careful analysis of the profiling issue post-9/11, see 
Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
1413 (2002). 
66. See HEYMANN, supra note 54, at 151. Writing prior to 9/1 1 ,  Heymann concluded that 
"the limited threat to uninhibited discussion posed by even reasonable efforts to monitor 
organizations preaching violence is a price worth paying to prevent political violence." Id. 
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In view of this tension, the task of drawing an appropriate line 
between legitimate and illegitimate investigative activity is an im­
mensely difficult one. But in any event the trend in the months since 
publication of Terrorism and the Constitution is away from rather than 
toward the adoption of new restraints. In May 2002, Attorney General 
Ashcroft announced significant revisions to the guidelines regulating 
FBI investigations of domestic security threats, explaining that "the 
war against terrorism is the central mission and highest priority of the 
FBI," that "terrorism prevention is the key objective under the revised 
guidelines," and that "the FBI must draw proactively on all lawful 
sources of information to identify terrorist threats and activities."67 
Accordingly, the new guidelines affirmatively authorize agents to 
"scour public sources for information on future terrorist threats" even 
in the absence of "specific investigative predicates."68 Similarly, " [f]or 
the purpose of detecting or preventing terrorist activities, the FBI is 
authorized to visit any place and attend any event that is open to the 
public, on the same terms and conditions as members of the public 
generally."69 In addition, changes were made to the rules regarding 
preliminary inquiries to ensure that agents are authorized to collect 
information about suspected terrorist groups even in the absence of 
sufficient evidence to open a formal investigation.70 
The tension between these developments and civil liberties con­
cerns is symptomatic of a broader conflict. As a society, we expect -
67. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Remarks on the Attorney General's Guidelines, 
(May 30, 2002) available at www.fas.org/irp/news/2002/05/ag053002.html (May 30, 2002). 
68. Id. 
69. Id. Writing in another context, Dempsey has pointed out that these changes affect 
only investigations of purely domestic threats, and that the revisions do not relate to parallel 
(but much less restrictive) guidelines for terrorism threats posed by foreign entities such as 
Al Qaeda. See Jerry Berman & James X. Dempsey, Center for Democracy and Technology, 
CDT's Guide to the FBI Guidelines: Impact on Civ,il Liberties and Security - the Need for 
Congressional Oversight (June 26, 2002), available at http://www.cdt.org/wiretap/020626 
guidelines.shim. 
70. See Fact Sheet, Attorney General's Guidelines: Detecting and Preventing Terrorist 
Attacks, at http://www.usdoj .gov/ag/speeches/2002/53002factsheet.html. (May 30, 2002). 
These changes were paralleled at the local level in New York and Chicago, where 1970s re­
forms had produced, not self-regulation, but consent decrees sharply limiting the ability of 
police to observe or investigate First Amendment activity. In early 2003, a federal judge 
agreed to vacate the longstanding consent decree restricting New York City police after the 
city adopted internal limitations in line with the new FBI Guidelines. See Handschu v. Spe­
cial Services Div. , No. 71 CIV. 2203 (CSH), 2003 WL 1529197 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2003); 
Handschu v. Special Services Div., No. 71 CIV. 2203 (CSH), 2003 WL 302258 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
13, 2003); see also Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 
2001) (modifying Chicago consent decree so as to permit monitoring of potential terrorists in 
certain situations). But cf Andrea Dukakis, Denver Residents Surprised by Police Files Kept 
on Political Activists, NPR MORNING EDITION, Feb. 25, 2003, 2003 WL 4856338 (describing 
Denver police practice of monitoring and maintaining files relating to political activities 
without connection to criminal suspicion or security threats); Associated Press, Denver Po­
lice Settle Lawsuit Over Secret Files, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 18, 2003, at A-12 (de­
scribing settlement between Denver and the ACLU constraining this practice). 
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we demand - that the government take effective measures not just to 
convict those who commit terrorist acts, but also to prevent terrorist 
acts from occurring in the first place. There is public outcry when the 
government fails in the latter capacity, demanding to know why the 
government did not do more.71 At the same time, we also expect and 
demand that the government will carry out this responsibility within 
constitutional boundaries, including restraints preserving freedom of 
expression and association. These competing demands produce an 
inherent dilemma, and Cole and Dempsey would resolve it by apply­
ing a traditional criminal law enforcement paradigm to antiterrorism 
investigations.72 The contrast with the terrorism prevention paradigm 
actually adopted by the Administration is sharp. Even those who 
disagree with the authors' recommendations will find that Terrorism 
and the Constitution makes a valuable contribution by marshaling the 
civil liberties objections to the prevention paradigm and placing them 
in historical perspective. 
IV. ENEMY ALIENS: BREAKING THE GOLDEN RULE 
Much has happened on the legal front of the war on terrorism 
since Terrorism and the Constitution was published in early 2002, and 
many of these developments are addressed in Enemy Aliens: Double 
Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism. But 
Enemy Aliens is not merely an updated version of Terrorism and the 
Constitution. It also is an elaborate and thought-provoking argument 
about the manner in which the balance between liberty and security 
impacts noncitizens. 
The heart of Cole's argument is that a double standard pervades 
our approach to striking the balance between liberty and security. He 
explains that 
[w]hen a democratic society strikes the balance between liberty and secu­
rity in ways that impose the costs of security measures equally on all, one 
might be relatively confident that the political process will achieve a 
proper balance. Since September 1 1 ,  we have repeatedly done precisely 
the opposite, sacrificing the rights of a minority group - noncitizens, and 
especially Arab and Muslim noncitizens - in the name of the majority's 
security interests. (Enemy Aliens, p. 5) 
To Cole, this tradeoff is inherently unconstitutional, unethical, and 
counterproductive. Worse still, he argues, the tradeoff is illusory 
71. See, e.g. , John J. Goldman, 9111 Commission Urged to Find Answers; Those Whose 
Lives Were Deeply Affected by the Tragedy Testify, Demand Accountability, L.A. TIMES, 
Apr. l,  2003, at A19. 
72. "All antiterrorism investigations in the United States, whether of foreign or domes­
tic groups, should be conducted pursuant to criminal rules, with the goal of arresting people 
planning, supporting, or carrying out violent activities and convicting them in a court of 
law." TERRORISM, p. 186. 
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because the deprivations imposed upon noncitizens serve as prece­
dents for the government later to strip the same rights from citizens" 
(Enemy Aliens, pp. 7-9). "Virtually every significant government secu­
rity initiative implicating civil liberties - including penalizing speech, 
ethnic profiling, guilt by association, the use of administrative meas­
ures to avoid the safeguards of the criminal process, and preventive 
detention - has originated in a measure targeted at noncitizens" 
(Enemy Aliens, p. 85). In the end, Cole warns, our willingness to vio­
late the Golden Rule leaves us with an expanded national security 
state, a diminished sphere of private autonomy, and even less security. 
Cole builds this critique on historical foundations, providing a 
survey laden with personal detail in support of his thesis.73 His discus­
sion of detention without an individualized showing of dangerousness 
provides a good example. Cole points out that this type of detention 
- what we might call group detention - originated in 1798 with the 
Enemy Alien Act.74 That law, which remains on the books today, 
authorizes the executive branch during times of declared war to detain 
or deport at its discretion any citizens of an enemy nation who may 
happen to be in the United States.75 The law does not require an indi­
vidual showing that the detained or deported alien poses a danger; it is 
enough that the alien is a citizen of our military opponent.76 
For the next 150 years, group detention remained a security meas­
ure available only against noncitizens. But this changed during the 
Second World War as a result of the notorious decision to imprison 
wholesale not only Japanese citizens but also Japanese-Americans, 
without any showing of individual dangerousness.77 As Cole points 
out, race served as a bridge to cross the citizen/noncitizen divide in 
that instance (Enemy Aliens, pp. 95-98). And shortly after World War 
II, the possibility of citizens being subjected to group detention 
emerged again in connection with a Justice Department program to 
identify suspected communists whom the government might detain in 
the event the president declared a national emergency in connection 
with the communist threat (Enemy Aliens, pp. 100-102). 
73. ENEMY ALIENS, pp. 85-179. Some portions of this history will be familiar to readers 
of Terrorism and the Constitution - such as the story of the L.A. 8 - but on the whole there 
is remarkably little overlap between these two books. 
74. ENEMY ALIENS, pp. 91-104; see Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, §§ 1-3, 1 Stat. 577 (codi­
fied at 50 U .S.C. §§ 21 (2000) ). 
75. The Enemy Alien Act was used frequently up through the Second World War, but 
as we no longer formally declare wars its importance has decreased considerably over the 
past fifty years. 
76. See Enemy Alien Act § 1 .  
77. See Korematsu v .  United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (affirming conviction for defi­
ance of the military's exclusion order); PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983); ERIC L. 
MULLER, FREE TO DIE FOR THEIR COUNTRY: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN 
DRAFT RESISTERS IN WORLD WAR II (2001). 
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In another example of historical linkages between measures 
directed at noncitizens and citizens, Cole points to the changes in the 
immigration laws in 1903 that authorized tl:ie. exclusion of aliens who 
advocated or believed in the illegal overthrow of government (Enemy 
Aliens, p. 107). He notes that a proposal to criminalize such advocacy 
by citizens was rejected at the time, only to resurface successfully 
during the World War I era in the form of the infamous Sedition Act 
in 1918, as well as in various state antisyndicalism laws (Enemy Aliens, 
pp. 107-08, 112). Similarly, Cole observes that the 1903 exclusion law 
was amended in 1917 to require exclusion of aliens who were members 
of organizations promoting the illegal overthrow of government.78 
Describing this as a form of guilt by association, Cole contends that 
the 1917 immigration law set a precedent that the government would 
use in later years to punish citizens for their association with commu­
nist groups (Enemy Aliens, pp. 106-07, 130-32). And in a more recent 
example, Cole points to the fact that "material support" became a 
basis for excluding aliens from the United States before it became a 
criminal act for citizens (Enemy Aliens, pp. 60-61). 
Not everyone will come away convinced by these observations that 
it is inherently illegitimate for society to concentrate a security meas­
ure on noncitizens, however illegitimate it might be to do so in a 
particular case. One important objection is that some security threats 
- Al Qaeda comes to mind - emanate from abroad. In such circum­
stances, where the threat is posed primarily if not exclusively by non­
citizens, crafting a security measure to target such noncitizens may be 
a reasoned response rather than a mere expedient creating a false 
impression of enhanced security.79 Another objection, limited to secu­
rity measures in the immigration context, derives from the fact that 
the "Supreme Court has staked out a role of extreme deference to the 
political branches' 'plenary power' .over immigration."80 The plenary 
power doctrine "carves out a unique space in American public law: a 
realm where the Constitution does not· always apply."81 On this theory, 
there are at least some security steps the government may take in the 
immigration context which cannot also be taken with respect to citi-
78. ENEMY ALIENS, pp. 109-10. This was' a' major expansion of the government's exclu­
sionary power given the relative difficulty of showing that an alien had advocated a .particu­
lar belief, and the relative ease of showing membership in a group to whom such ideas could 
be attributed. 
· 
79. Cole acknowledges this concern, but contends it is outweighed by a quartet of con­
siderations: maintaining a "double standard," in his view, is undesirable because it cannot be 
maintained in the long run; will be counterproductive; contributes to government overreac­
tion; and is both illegal and immoral. See ENEMY ALIENS, pp. 6-7. 
80. Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the 
Porous Border of the Plenary Power Dodrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087, 1091 (1995). 
81. Id. at 1 127. 
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zens.82 Notwithstanding these objections, Cole clearly succeeds in 
drawing attention to the inherent political vulnerability of noncitizens 
and their resulting susceptibility to scapegoating during times of 
heightened security concerns. 
And what of the second stage of Cole's thesis, which contends that 
deprivations of noncitizens' rights serve as templates for extending the 
same deprivations to citizens? If correct, this argument is in consider­
able tension with the social-learning model described above. The 
template argument implies, after all, that calibration errors do not 
shrink over time but, on the contrary, spread from the realm of aliens 
to citizens. There are reasons . to hesitate, however, before accepting 
this proposition. 
Some readers will not be persuaded that a causal relationship 
exists between repressive measures applied to aliens and those later 
applied to citizens. Consider the purported connection between the 
Enemy Alien Act and the Japanese internments of the Second World 
War. As Cole himself observes, the Enemy Alien Act was on the 
books - and frequently used - for a century and a half before the 
group-identity concept it embodied was extended to citizens (Enemy 
Aliens, pp. 91-93) .  This is a long latency period to support a causal 
connection. And even where the interval is shorter there nonetheless 
remain questions about the mechanism or dynamic purportedly link­
ing the two instances, as with the adoption of material support as a 
ground for excluding aliens in 1990 and the criminalization of material 
support four years later. 
Perhaps more significantly, there are counterexamples in which the 
civil liberties of citizens were sacrificed without a noncitizen prece­
dent, or prior to the extension of a suppressive measure from nonciti­
zens to citizens. Consider the notorious Sedition Act of 1798.83 Under 
that infamous law, many citizens were prosecuted during the Adams 
Administration for political dissent (or less) notwithstanding their 
First Amendment rights.84 And extensive · repression of dissenting 
political speech also occurred before the Civil War with respect to 
82. Outside the immigration context, however, the " 'aliens' rights' tradition" controls. 
Id. at 1091. This means that "aliens enjoy a full panoply of constitutional rights" in most non­
immigration contexts. Id. In this vein, Cole devotes consideraJ?le text to a discussion of the 
rights of aliens under both the federal constitution and international law. ENEMY ALIENS, 
pp. 21 1 -27. 
83. Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, § 2, l 'Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801); see also CURTIS, 
supra note 18, at 58-79 (describing the background and legislative history of the Sedition 
Act). 
. 
84. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274-76 (1964) (discussing criticism of 
the Sedition Act and concluding that "the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the 
court of history"); CURTIS, supra note 18, at 80-104 (discussing prosecutions under the Sedi­
tion Act). 
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abolitionists, and during the Civil War with respect to opponents of 
the war.85 
But regardless of whether one is per�uaded by Cole's description 
of the historical cycle, his criticisms of post-9/11 antiterrorism meas­
ures remain to be addressed. In keeping with his theme Cole begins by 
arguing that "the government has not asked American citizens to sac­
rifice their liberty . . .  [but instead] has asked those . . .  who are not in a 
position to decline the offer because they have no voice in the demo­
cratic process" (Enemy Aliens, p. 21) .  As a consequence, the "war on 
terrorism has been waged largely through anti-immigrant measures" 
(Enemy Aliens, p. 21). 
Chief among these, Cole contends, is the pretextual use of immi­
gration law to implement a system of preventive detention for nonciti­
zens, and in particular for Arab and Muslim noncitizens.86 According 
to a report by the Justice Department's Office of the Inspector 
General, between September 11 ,  2001 and August 6, 2002, the FBI 
detained 762 noncitizens for immigration violations in connection with 
the 9/11 investigation.87 In each case, the INS was obliged to keep cus, 
tody of the noncitizen - even those who agreed to voluntary deporta­
tion (Enemy Aliens, pp. 32-33) - until the FBI was satisfied the indi­
vidual was not in fa<:;t involved in terrorism.88 This process took eighty 
days on average.89 Ultimately, only a handful of these detainees were 
85. See CURTIS, supra note 1 8, at 125-54, 260-63, 289-99 (discussing suppression of aboli­
tionist speech); id. at 300-56 (discussing suppressiOn of antiwar speech). 
86. ENEMY ALIENS, pp. 24-25: 
Because our economy literally depends on illegal immigration, we have long tolerated the 
presence of literally millions of noncitizens who have violated some immigration rule. This 
means the attorney general has extremely broad discretion in how and when to enforce im­
migration obligations; any immigrant community he targets will inevitably include many per­
sons here in violation of their' visas. In this sense, the immigration law functions largely as 
does the traffic law for drug law enforcement; it affords a convenient pretext for targeting 
millions of individuals. And just as the traffic laws facilitated "driving while black" enforce­
ment, so the immigration law has permitted ethnic profiling. 
87. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, u:s. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 1 1  
DETAINEES: A REVIEW O F  THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION 
CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 
(April 2003), at 2 [hereinafter INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT] . Cole points out that in ad­
dition to those detained in connection with.the 9/11 investigation, the Justice Department by 
January 2003 "had also reportedly detained and deport.ed some 1 ,100 more foreign nationals 
under the Absconder Apprehension lnitfative, which expressly targets for deportation Arabs 
and Muslims with outstanding deportation orders, among the more than 300,000 foreign na­
tionals living here with such orders. As of May 2003, another 2,747 noncitizens had been de­
tained in connection with a Special Registration program also directed at Arab and Muslim 
noncitizens." ENEMY ALIENS, p. 25. 
88. INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 87, at 37-71. 
89. Id. at 52. 
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deemed to have any connection with terrorism, prompting Cole to 
declare the preventive-detention program a "colossal failure. "90 
Cole also takes aim at the veil of secrecy placed over these immi­
gration proceedings, drawing effectively on his experience as counsel 
for one such detainee (Enemy Aliens, pp. 26-30). He writes that 
" [p]ublic disclosures not only might have increased objections to the 
government's measures, but, given that the widely cast net came up 
empty, would almost certainly have impaired confidence in the job our 
government was doing to protect us" (Enemy Aliens, p. 30). "The real 
concern," he suggests, "may have been not that Al Qaeda would find 
out what was going on, but that the American public would find out" 
(Enemy Aliens, p. 30). 
But Cole does not limit himself to those aspects of the war on ter­
rorism which relate to immigration law. He devotes equal attention 
and criticism to issues such as the government's use of the material 
witness statute to detain individuals on grounds Cole views as pretex­
tual (Enemy Aliens, pp. 35-39), and the government's decision to des­
ignate as "enemy combatants" American citizens Yaser Hamdi and 
Jose Padilla.91 Cole then shifts his attention from detention to detec­
tion, dealing first with the vexing issues surrounding racial-, religious-, 
and national origin-based methods of profiling (Enemy Aliens, pp. 47-
56). He also discusses the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,92 criti­
cizing the recent decision by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
90. ENEMY ALIENS, p. 25-26. Consistent with the adaptive-learning model, Cole inter­
prets the 9/11 detentions as confirmation of the government's recidivist tendencies. He con­
cedes that "Arabs and Muslims have not been interned en masse in the wake of September 
11 in the way that the Japanese were during World War II," but raises the question whether 
"that is because we have learned our lesson, or [because] the political forces are not suffi­
cient to sustain such a strategy?" ENEMY ALIENS, pp. 103-04. In a similar vein, Cole has 
compared the 9/11 detentions to the infamous "Palmer Raids" which resulted in the arrest of 
thousands of noncitizens following a string of anarchist bombings in 1919. See ENEMY 
ALIENS, pp. 117-28, 179 (describing the Palmer Raids and linking them to current 
antiterrorism policies); David Cole, We've Aimed, Detained, and Missed Before, WASH. 
POST, June 8, 2003, at Bl ("Then, as now, the·government went into 'preventive' mode, and 
exploited immigration law to sweep broadly.a�d blindly."). On the other hand, the very exis­
tence of the Inspector General's Report - and in particular the Department's apparent ac­
ceptance of substantially all of its recommendations - demonstrates the presence of iristitu­
tional safeguards that did not exist during these eariier periods. See Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Will 
Tighten Rules on Holding Terror Suspects, N.Y: TIMES, June 13, 2003, at Al. In  any event, 
the judgment that the program was a "colossal failure" assumes something we cannot know 
- that the detentions served no prevel).tive purpose except with respect to the handful of 
cases positively linked to terrorism. 
91. ENEMY ALIENS, pp. 39-46. On June 23, 2003, the Bush Administration designated a 
third man - Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri, a Qatari in the United States on a student visa -
as an enemy combatant. See Josh Meyer, Suspect Declared an Enemy Combatant, L.A. 
TIMES, June 24, 2003, at Al . 
92. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 ,  1820-1829, 
1841-1846, 1861-1863 (2000). 
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Court of Review upholding the Justice Department's interpretation of 
that law.93 
Although Cole's survey of the tools of. antiterrorism policy ranges 
over a wide array of topics, there is a common thread that unites much 
of the discussion: the tension between national security concerns and 
freedom of association, and in particular the government's use of guilt 
by association to achieve security goals. Cole explains that he has 
devoted much of his career "to defending foreign nationals targeted 
for their alleged political associations in cases raising national security 
claims and allegations of terrorist ties" (Enemy Aliens, p. 87). This 
long-standing interest manifests itself throughout both Enemy Aliens 
and Terrorism and the Constitution, nowhere more so than in discus­
sions of laws such as § 2339B punishing the provision of material sup­
port to designated foreign terrorist organizations (Enemy Aliens, pp. 
18, 58-64, 75-79, 230; Terrorism, pp. 118-125, 140-142, 152-155). These 
discussions are representative of . the arguments in both books, and 
they shed some light on the relative validity of the adaptive- and so­
cial-learning models. Accordingly, I devote the remaining pages to a 
close examination of Cole's· argument that § 2339B surreptitiously 
resurrects the unconstitutional principle of guilt by association.94 
V. GUILT BY ASSOCIATION AND MATERIAL SUPPORT 
The guilt by association . critique of § 2339B rests on the fact that 
the statute punishes the provision of material support to designated 
foreign terrorist organizations ("DFTOs") without regard · to whether 
the supporter specifically intended thereby to fµrther any illegal 
93 . . ENEMY ALIENS, p: 58-64; see In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (F.I.S.C.R. 2002) (re­
versing In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. 
Supp. 2d 61 1 (F.I.S.C. 2002)). Notably, James Dempsey was among the attorneys on one of 
the amicus briefs supporting the lower court's decision. See Brief on Behalf of Amici Curiae 
American Civil Liberties Union et al. In Support of Affirmance, In re Appeal from July 9, 
2002 Opinion of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (Nci. 02-001), 
available at www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/091902FISCRbrief.pdf. 
94. In Part V, I do not address another significant constitutional objection to § 2339B 
discussed in both books: whether the material support statutory scheme denies due process 
either to defendants or to the proscribed o'rganizations in the course of the designation proc­
ess. Compare Nat') Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 
2001 ) (holding that the designation process denied due process of law to designated organi­
zations), and United States v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (relying on 
National Council of Resistance to hold that § 2339B prosecution premised on unconstitu­
tional designation cannot proceed) (appeal pending), with 32 County Sovereignty Comm. v. 
Dep't of State, 292 F.3d 797 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (foreign entity without property or presence in 
the U.S. lacks due process rights to challenge desig11ation), and United States v. Sattar, 272 
F. Supp. 2d 348, 363-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (rejecting the holding in Rahmani and denying due 
process challenge); cf Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57 
(D.D.C. 2002) (rejecting due process challenge to a similar designatfon process under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act), aff d, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003); 
Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (same). 
May 2003] Civil Liberties and Terrorism Prevention 1433 
conduct; the statute's intent element requires only that the defendant 
knew that the support was being rendered to the DFT0.95 Citing this 
feature, the authors· in both. books draw an analogy between § 2339B 
and an array of measures undertaken by the government during the 
Cold War in an effort to suppress the threat posed by communism 
(Terrorism, pp. 118-119, 154; Enemy Aliens, pp. 58-64). Those 
anticommunist measures similarly lacked an intent requirement, anq 
as a result the Supreme Court in a series of landmark decisions struck 
them down on the ground that they amounted to punishment on the 
basis of guilt by · association.96 According to the authors, § 2339B 
operates "under the guise · of cutting off funding for terrorism" 
precisely in order to avoid this constitutional restraint.97 
This claim is significantly overstated. The measures which gave rise 
to the prohibition of guilt by association purposefully suppressed 
advocacy of · communist doctrines and, especially, membership in 
communist organizations. In contrast, § 2339B in most respects is a 
content-neutral law which burdens First Amendment rights only inci­
dentally. In this respect, § 2339B is akin tO laws authorizing embarg9es 
of hostile. foreign states or' restricting the export of certain items to 
them. Such laws may implicate First Amendment considerations, of 
course, but they do not thereby trigger the same degree of judicial 
scrutiny as would a measure intentionally targeting expression. 
The guilt by association critique is not entirely wide of the mark, 
however. The array of activities constituting "material support" ranges 
widely, and includes "personnel." A close examination reveals that the 
government interprets this term to encompass the act of providing 
one's self as a member of a DFTO, so long as one is subject to the 
DFTO's direction and control.98 This status-based prohibition differs 
saliently from the other, conduct-based aspects of the material support 
definition. More to the point, this interpretation directly implicates the 
Cold War precedents upon which the guilt by association critique 
rests. In those limited instances where the government proceeds under 
§ 2339B on the theory that a defendant provided himself or herself as 
95. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339b (a)(l) (2000) (Whoever . . .  "knowingly provides.material sup­
port or resource to a foreign terrorist organ,ization" violates the statµte). By way of example, 
this knowledge requirement ensures that a p�r�on cannot be prosecuted under § 2339B for 
giving money to a charity that unbeknownst to the donor passes the money to a terrorist 
group. 
96.· See infra notes 106-118 and accompanying text. 
97. TERRORISM, p. 153. In keeping with t)le theme. of Enemy Aliens, Cole points out 
that the first material support law was e.nacted not in the criminal law context but instead in 
the immigration law context. ENEMY ALIENS, 75. The Immigration Act of 1990 provided 
that an alien could be excluded from the United Sta'tes if he or she had engaged in conduct 
which the alien knew or should have known would provide "material support" to a person, 
group, or government engaged iµ terrorism . . See 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2000) (as 
amended by Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990)). 
98. See infra notes 127-132 and accompanying text. 
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personnel to a DFTO, therefore, the statute should be interpreted to 
require proof of the defendant's intent to facilitate illegal conduct.99 
I explain these conclusions in more detail below. But first I attempt 
to clarify what it means to argue that a law resurrects "guilt by associa­
tion," because the phrase turns out to be more complex than expected. 
For similar reasons, I also look closely at the meaning of "material 
support." Both clarifications play an important role in the assessment 
of the authors' argument. 
A. The Meaning of Guilt by Association 
"Guilt by association" is an umbrella concept that encompasses 
two distinct methods of government regulation that concern the 
relationship of one person to another or to a group. One method could 
be termed "vicarious punishment." In this sense, guilt by association 
refers to punishment of A for specific actions committed by B. The 
second method could be termed "criminalized association." Here, the 
government punishes A not for any specific conduct by B, but for 
associating with B. 
Conspiracy law provides an illustration of the distinction between 
the two concepts. The punishment of conspiracy itself is an example of 
criminalized association; the law seeks to discourage the formation of 
groups associated for criminal purposes because such associations 
"make possible the attainment of ends more complex than those 
which one criminal could accomplish."100 But separate and apart from 
the punishment conspirators face for their association with one 
another, conspirators may also face vicarious punishment for the spe­
cific criminal acts of their coconspirators pursuant to the Pinkerton 
doctrine. 101 
Vicarious punishment is not entirely alien to our system, as the 
existence of the Pinkerton doctrine demonstrates.102 But vicarious 
99. Insofar as a defendant did in fact become a member of a DFTO subject to its direc­
tion and control, the burden of this mens rea requirement by no means will preclude prose­
cution. Evidence of the DFTO's illegal activities and the defendant's awareness of them may 
be enough for a jury to infer the requisite intent. 
100. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961). For a thorough discussion of 
the rationale behind conspiracy law, see Neal Kumar Katya!, Conspiracy Theory, 1 12 YALE 
L.J. 1307 (2003). 
101. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (holding that conspirator can 
be liable for reasonably foreseeable actions of co-conspirator committed in furtherance of 
their jointly agreed illegal end); see also Katya!, supra note 100 at 1372-75. Justice Scalia 
referred to this form of guilt by association when he wrote recently that "[t]here is no guilt 
by association . . .  enabling the sovereignty .of one State to be abridged under § 5 of the Four­
teenth Amendment because of violation by another State or by most other States, or even by 
49 other States." Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003) (Scalia, J . ,  
dissenting). 
102. For an illuminating discussion of the instrumental value of vicarious punishment, 
see Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003). 
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punishment nonetheless clashes sharply with our commitments to due 
process of law and freedom of association.103 As Justice Stevens wrote 
in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., "[t]he right to associate does 
not lose all constitutional protection merely because some members of 
the group may have participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that 
itself is not protected."104 
If § 2339B were a vicarious punishment statute operating on a 
principle analogous to the Pinkerton doctrine, its failure to require 
proof that the defendant intended to further any illegal conduct would 
render it unconstitutional. But § 2339B is not a vicarious punishment 
statute; it does not authorize punishment of one person for the con­
duct of someone else. 105 If the statute does involve guilt by association, 
therefore, it must be in the second sense of that phrase - criminalized 
association. 
Attempts to criminalize association were frequent during the 
struggle with communism, and as a result a well-developed body of 
First Amendment doctrine formed · reflecting a judgment about the 
acceptable parameters of the concept.106 The Supreme Court first 
addressed this issue in De Jonge v. Oregon, in which Oregon prose­
cuted a man under its syndicalism law for helping to organize a public 
meeting of the Communist Party in 1934.107 The Supreme Court held 
103. "[W]e have no tradition of imputed guilt in our legal system, and we ordinarily 
recoil at the notion of guilt by association." Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate 
Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 319 (1996); see also United States v. Johnson, 886 F.2d 1 120, 
1 124 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting potential due process limitations on the Pinkerton doctrine in 
cases involving attenuated relationships between the conspirator and the substantive crime); 
Blasi, supra note 25, at 496 ("Even when a member actively participates in the affairs of an 
organization and knows about and shares its illegal objectives, vicarious criminal responsi­
bility for the speeches and writings of others is not warranted."). 
104. 458 U.S. 886, 908 (1982) (holding that individuals and organizations involved in an 
otherwise legal boycott could not be held liable for the illegal conduct of other participants 
in the boycott); see also Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1961): 
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on a status or 
conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to 
other concededly criminal activity . . .  , that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to 
satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
105. As Vincent Blasi has explained, 
[ c ]riminal responsibility should not be considered "vicarious" when it is based on specifically 
defined conduct by the defendant, including verbal solicitation to illegal advocacy, that is 
prohibited because of its significant causal connection to harmful consequences. The type of 
liability that is problematic under the pathological perspective is that which permits persons 
to be convicted for nothing more than failing to prevent, repudiate, report, or disassociate 
themselves from the illegal advocacy of their political associates. 
Blasi, supra note 25, at 496 n.162 (emphasis added). 
106. For a thorough and thoughtful review of the role that American communism 
played in developing these principles, see Marc Rohr, Communists and the First Amendment: 
The Shaping of Freedom of Advocacy in the Cold War Era, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1991). 
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that the prosecution violated De Jonge's assembly and petition rights, 
observing that 
[ t ]hose who assist in the conduct of [peaceable] meetings cannot be 
branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free 
speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the aus­
pices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the 
relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the 
bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects.108 
Notwithstanding De Jonge, three years later Congress enacted the 
Alien Registration Act, also known as the Smith Act . 109 This law, in 
relevant part, criminalized membership in any organization advocating 
the forcible and illegal overthrow of government, without regard to 
the member's intent to further any illegal conduct. 1 10 After World War 
II, similar instances of criminalized association became central to a 
wide of array of national, state, and local laws and policies aimed at 
suppressing the Communist Party. Eventually, in Scales v. United 
States, the Supreme Court weighed in on the constitutional questions 
raised by the Smith Act's membership prohibition. 1 11 
The Court in Scales did not actually declare the membership provi­
sion unconstitutional, but did restrain its scope dramatically in order 
to confine it to constitutional bounds. The key to the decision was 
Justice Harlan's distinction between traditional criminal conspiracies 
and what might be called "hybrid groups" - those with legal and 
illegal functions. 1 12 Justice Harlan conceded the government's power 
107. 299 U.S. 353 (1937). The case had elements of both forms of guilt by association. It 
involved vicarious punishment in that prosecutors put on proof that party members had 
broken the syndicalism law at other meetings. And it involved criminalized association in 
that De Jonge was charged with nothing more than "assist[ing] in the conduct of a public 
meeting, albeit otherwise lawful, which was held under the auspices of the Communist 
Party." De Jonge, 299 U.S. at 362. 
108. Id. at 365. 
109. Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (codified with some differences 
in language at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2003)). 
1 10. See id. , stating in relevant part that: 
[w]hoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly of per· 
sons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any . . .  government 
by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of. or affiliates with, any such society, group, 
or assembly or persons, knowing the purposes thereof" shall be subject to a sentence of up to 
twenty years, a fine of up to $20,000, and shall remain ineligible for e mployment by the fed· 
era! government for five years from the date of conviction. (emphasis added). 
1 1 1 .  367 U.S. 203 (1961). 
1 1 2. Scales, 367 U.S. at  229. An organization may be hybrid despite being predominately 
legitimate. Consider the boycott of white-owned businesses in Claiborne County, Missis­
sippi, at issue in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. , 458 U.S. 886 (1982). Indisputably, the 
boycotters in large part acted within their rights in pursuit of admirable goals of racial justice 
and equality, but there were occasional instances of illegal conduct as well. Justice Stevens 
put it best when he wrote that the boycott "included elements of criminality and elements of 
majesty." Id. at 888. 
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to criminalize association in the context of an ordinary criminal 
conspiracy, notwithstanding associational rights. 1 1 3  A "blanket prohibi­
tion of association with a group having both legal and illegal aims," on 
the other hand, would pose "a real danger that legitimate political 
expression or association would be impaired." 1 14 
Justice Harlan's point was not that the government lacked power 
to criminalize association with a hybrid group; it was that this power 
must be narrowly circumscribed in order to avoid undue interference 
with legitimate expression and association. Thus he concluded that the 
government could not punish membership in a hybrid group without 
"clear proof that a defendant 'specifically intend[s] to accomplish [the 
aims of the organization] by resort to violence. '  " 1 1 5  As to 
the member for whom the organization is a vehicle for the advancement 
of legitimate aims and policies[, that individual] does not fall within the 
ban of the statute: he lacks the requisite specific intent to bring about the 
overthrow of the government as speedily as circumstances would permit. 
Such a person may be foolish, deluded, or perhaps merely optimistic, but 
he is not by this statute made a criminal. 1 16 
Construing the membership provision to contain a specific intent 
restriction, the Supreme Court upheld the law.1 1 7  
In a string of subsequent decisions addressing measures suppress­
ing membership in communist groups, the Supreme Court repeatedly 
reaffirmed the Scales holding.1 18 Taken together these cases establish a 
constitutional litmus test for laws that criminalize association with a 
hybrid group. Does the law require proof that the defendant specifi­
cally intended to further the illegal ends of the organization? If not, 
then the law sweeps within its grasp too much innocent association. It 
1 13. See Scales, 367 U .S. at 229. 
1 14. Id. 
1 15. Id. (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299 (1961) (Noto was a companion 
decision issued the same day as Scales)). 
1 16. Id. at 229-30 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
1 17. Id. at 222-24, 229-30. 
1 18. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (striking down regulatory 
scheme in which membership in a "subversive" organization provided grounds for dismissal 
of any public school employee); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 260, 265 (1967) (striking 
down provision of the Subversive Activities Control Act making it illegal for members of a 
"Communist-action organization" to be employed in defense-related facility in certain cir­
cumstances, and observing that the "statute quite literally establishes guilt by association 
alone, without any need to establish that an individual's association poses the threat feared 
by the Government in proscribing it"); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 ,  17 (1966) (striking 
down law which punished public officials who took oath of office but who knowingly became 
or remained member of communist group; " (!Jaws such as this which are not restricted in 
scope to those who join with the 'specific intent' to further illegal action impose, in effect, a 
conclusive presumption that the member shares the unlawful aims of the organization"); 
Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U .S. 500, 511  (1964) (striking down statute precluding mem­
bers of a communist organization from obtaining passports for lack of a specific intent ele­
ment). 
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is, in short, a matter of narrow tailoring. But does § 2339B criminalize 
association in this respect? The question is crucial, because § 2339B 
purposefully does not require proof of specific intent to further illegal 
conduct. 1 1 9  
B .  The Meaning of Material Support 
In contrast to the Smith Act membership provision discussed 
above, § 2339B on its face does not prohibit membership in a DFfO. 
Instead, it punishes anyone who "knowingly provides material suppor­
tor resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or 
conspires to do so. "120 The phrase "material support or resources" in 
turn is defined to include any of the following: "currency or monetary 
instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, 
expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identi­
fication, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal sub­
stances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical 
assets, except medicine or religious materials."12 1  
For analytical purposes, this list can be divided into several catego­
ries. First, material support includes funding (currency, monetary 
instruments, and financial securities). Second, it includes a wide 
variety of tangible equipment (false documentation or identification, 
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, 
explosives, and other physical assets). Third, it includes certain serv­
ices (financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, 
and transportation). Finally, it includes "personnel." The provision of 
personnel might be taken as another form of service, but for reasons 
explained below I will treat it as its own category for purposes of 
assessing its relationship to the First Amendment. 
The first year and a half since 9/11 has seen an unprecedented 
wave of § 2339B prosecutions, accounting for each category of 
material support described above. 122 Funding is at issue, for example, 
1 19. Section 23398 requires only that the defendant be aware that the recipient of the 
support is a DFTO. This approach is intentional. Two years prior to the enactment of § 
23398, Congress enacted a more limited material support law - 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. Section 
2339A criminalizes material support only when the defendant knows or intends that the aid 
will be used by the recipient (which need not be a DFTO) to further. specific criminal acts. 
Critics argued that § 2339A was of little or no use in choking off the flow of aid from the 
United States to foreign terrorist groups. See, e.g. , Todd Gillman, FBI Looks Into Islamic 
Fund Raising; Muslim Officials Deny Supporting Terrorism, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 
18, 1994, at 29A (citing unnamed diplomatic and law enforcement sources). This criticism, 
combined with the political imperative created by the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, pro­
duced § 23398 just two years later. 
120. 18 U.S.C. § 23398(a)(l) (2000). 
121.  18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (incorporated by reference in 18 U.S.C. § 23398(g)(4)). 
122. Section 23398 saw action on only four occasions in its first five years. See United 
States v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (describing pending prosecution of 
seven men for providing funds to Mujaheddin-e Khalq (hereinafter "MEK"); David E. 
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in the case against Mohammed Ali Hasan Al-Moayad, a Yemeni cleric 
whom prosecutors allege has raised millions of dollars for both Al 
Qaeda and Hamas.123 In other instances, the § 2339B charge turns on 
the provision of equipment, as in the indictment of a group of men for 
attempting to sell hashish and heroin to undercover agents in 
exchange for "Stinger" anti-aircraft missiles which then would be pro­
vided to Al Qaeda.124 A number of cases include allegations of mate­
rial support in the form of services, as in the prosecution of Earnest 
James Ujaama for conspiring to create and operate a training camp 
and safehquses in the United States on behalf of Al Qaeda.125 Finally, 
the § 2339B charges in several instances relate to the provision of 
Kaplan & Monica M. Ekman, Homegrown Terrorists: How a Hezbo/lah Cell Made Millions 
in Sleepy Charlotte, N. C., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 10, 2003 at 30 (describing the 
prosecution of cigarette smuggling ring using funds to buy equipment for Hezbollah; the 
prosecution resulted in the first jury convictions under § 2339B); John Mintz & Michael 
Grunwald, FBI Terror Probes Focus on U.S. Muslims, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1998, at Al 
(describing prosecution of Fawzi Mustapha Assi for providing GPS gear, nightvision goggles, 
and infrared cameras; Assi absconded before trial); Press Release, United States Attorney's 
Office, Central District of California (Oct. 26, 1990) (describing prosecution of Bahram 
Tabatabai for providing false identification to MEK; Tabatabai pied guilty before trial), 
available at www.usdoj.gov/usao/cac/pr/218.htm. In the months since 9/11 ,  in contrast, there 
have been at least ten prosecutions involving thirty defendants. One Justice Department of­
ficial recently testified, moreover, that the Department is pursuing more than seventy ter­
rorist-financing or material-support investigations and that it has brought "support" charges 
against sixty-one individuals. See Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investi­
gations, House Committee on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 1 (2003) (prepared statement 
of Alice Fisher, Deputy Assistant Attorney General), available at http:l/financialservices. 
house.gov/media/pdf/031103af.pdf. The discrepancy between my figure of thirty and her fig­
ure of sixty-one may reflect charges under other support-related laws such as § 2339A; the 
existence of sealed indictments; or pending investigations. See, e.g. , Nicholas K. Geranios, 
Ex-Gridder Held in Probe of Two Islamic Charities, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 19, 2003, at B4 
(describing material support investigations of two Islamic charities). 
· 
123. See United States v. Zayed, (M-03-0043) (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (detailing similar allega­
tions against Al-Moayad's assistant); Affidavit in Support of Arrest Warrant, United States 
v. Al-Moayad, M-03-0016 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Indictment, United States v. Sattar, No. 
02 Cr. 395 (JGK) (S.D.N.Y.) 'lI 'lI 21(cc)-(gg) (alleging that Ahmed Abdel Sattar and Yassir 
Al-Sirri arranged the transfer of funds to the Islamic Group, a DFTO). 
124. See Indictment, United States v. Shah, No. 02 Cr 2912L (S.D. Cal 2002); see also 
Criminal Complaint, United States v. Varela, No. 1 1-02-1008M (S.D. Tex. 2002) (alleging 
scheme to purchase a range of weapons and equipment on behalf of the United Self-Defense 
Forces of Colombia); United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (de­
scribing allegation that Sattar provided communications equipment, among other things). 
125. See Indictment, United States v. Ujaama (W.D. Wash.) [hereinafter Ujaama In­
dictment]; see also Indictment, United States v. Al-Arian, No. 8:03-CR-T (M.D. Fla.) (al­
leging, among other things, provision of accounting services); Indictment, United States v. 
Battle., No. Cr. 02-399 HA (D. Oregon) (alleging that Battel and five others were involved 
in an attempt to enter Afghanistan in late 2001 in order to provide military services to Al 
Qaeda); Criminal Complaint, United States v. Hawash, No. Cr. 03-M-481 (D. Or.) (same); 
Indictment, United States v. Paracha, No. 03 Cr. 236 (S.D.N.Y.) (alleging provision of finan­
cial and other services to Al Qaeda). 
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personnel to a DFfO, as in the cases against John Walker Lindh and 
Lynne Stewart.126 
The personnel charges are of particular interest. In some respects, 
the meaning of "personnel" is straightforward. According to the 
United States Attorneys' Manual: 
a person may be prosecuted under § 23398 for providing "personnel" to 
a designated foreign terrorist organization if and only if that person has 
knowingly provided the organization with one or more individuals to 
work under the foreign entity's direction or control. . . .  Only individuals 
who have subordinated themselves to the [DFTO], i.e. , those acting as 
full-time or part-time employees or otherwise taking orders from the en­
tity, are under its direction or control.127 
There is, however, a twist: the government interprets "personnel" 
to include not only the act of recruiting others but, also, the act of 
providing yourself as personnel. And in substance, the reflexive inter­
pretation of personnel criminalizes the status of being a member of a 
DFfO subject to its direction or control. This position is stated 
expressly in the United States Attorneys' Manual, which explains that: 
[t]here are two different ways of providing "personnel" to a designated 
foreign terrorist organization: 1) by working under the direction or con­
trol of the organization; or 2) by recruiting another to work under its di­
rection or control. The statute encompasses both methods, so long as the 
requisite direction or control is present.128 
It is not clear to what extent the government has relied on the 
reflexive interpretation of "personnel" in actual § 2339B prosecutions; 
the indictments and criminal complaints in the § 2339B cases do not 
specify the aspect of the material support definition in issue. It 
appears, however, that the reflexive-personnel theory has surfaced in 
at least three cases. One is the prosecution of John Walker Lindh, 
1 26. See United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 , 568 (E.D. Ya. 2002); Sattar, 272 F. 
Supp. 2d at 357; see also Ujaama Indictment, supra note 125. For detailed discussions of the 
Steward prosecution, see Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity: Regulating the 
Roles of Lawyers for Clients Accused of Terrorist Activity, 62 MD. L. REV. 173 (2003) [here­
inafter Margulies, The Virtues of Vices of Solidarity], and George Packer, Left Behind, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 42. 
127. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, u. s. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, § 9-91.100 (June 2001) 
[hereinafter U. S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL) , available at http:www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_ 
reading__room/title9/9lmcrm.htm; see also Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 572 (construing "per­
sonnel" to include the direction or control criterion). But see Humanitarian Law Project v. 
Reno, 205 F.3d 1 130, 1 1 37-38 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding in the context of an interlocutory 
appeal from a preliminary injunction that "personnel" is unconstitutionally vague because it 
might be thought to encompass independent advocacy on behalf of a DFTO). The district 
court in Humanitarian Law Project subsequently issued a permanent injunction on this 
ground. See Henry Weinstein, Judge Strikes Down Parts of 1996 Terrorism Law, L.A. TIMES, 
Oct. 5, 200 1 ,  at A4. The issue currently is back before the Ninth Circuit, and the Justice 
Department is considering legislation that would incorporate the "direction or control" cri­
teria into the statutory definition, among other things. See infra note 179. 
128. See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 127, at * 9-91.100. 
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which resulted in a plea agreement.129 As the district judge described 
the charges, Lindh was "accused of joining groups that do not merely 
advocate terror, violence, and the murder of innocents; these groups 
actually carry out what they advocate and those who join them, at 
whatever level, participate in the group's acts of terror, violence, and 
murder. "130 Anot.her case that might involve the self-provision of 
personnel is the ongoing prosecution of the men from Lackawanna 
who attended al Farooq.13 1  Finally, the government has expressly 
asserted this theory in connection with the prosecutions of Lynne 
Stewart and Ahmed Abdel Sattar.132 
Even without the reflexive interpretation of personnel, § 2339B 
has tremendous utility for preventing terrorism due to its capacity to 
cut off the flow of funds, equipment, and services to DFfOs. But 
interpreting "personnel" reflexively gives § 2339B an additional; more 
direct capacity for prevention. With this interpretation, the govern­
ment has grounds to arrest a suspected member of a DFfO without 
having to wait for evidence that the suspect is acting in furtherance of 
129. For an interesting post-mortem on the Lindh prosecution, see Jane Mayer, Lost in 
the Jihad, NEW YORKER, Mar. 10, 2003, at 50. 
130. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 569 (emphasis added). 
131 .  See Gaba I, supra note 3, 220 F. Supp. 2d 182, 194 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that 
one can provide material support to a DFfO "by offering one's services to said organiza­
tion"). In light of the emphasis on training in the Lackawanna indictments and plea agree­
ments, moreover, the government may in that case be using a reflexive interpretation not 
only of "personnel" but, also, "training." See id. (holding that "one can be found to have 
'provided material support' . . .  by . . .  allowing one's self to be indoctrinated and trained as a 
'resource' in that organization's beliefs and activities"). Such an interpretation of "training" 
is difficult to square with the statutory text and, notably, the U.S. Attorney's Manual does 
not appear to authorize it. See U.S. ATIORNEYS MANUAL, supra note 127, at § 9-91.100 (in­
structing that "a person may be prosecuted under § 2339B for providing 'training' to a desig­
nated foreign terrorist organization if and only if that person has knowingly provided in­
struction to the organization designed to impart one or more specific skills" (emphasis 
added)). Further constitutional challenges to the application of § 2339B in the Lackawanna 
case will not be forthcoming, however, in light of the fact that all of the apprehended defen­
dants have entered guilty pleas. See Press Release, U .S. Dep't of Justice, Seventh Defendant 
Named in Buffalo Cell Case, Charged with Providing Material Support to Al Qaeda, May 
21, 2003 (describing plea agreements and indicating that the remaining Lackawanna suspect 
remains at large, possibly outside the United States), available at 2003 WL 21197083. On a 
disturbing note, the Wall Street Journal recently reported that at least some of these plea 
agreements were reached after prosecutors allegedly "threatened the defendants with 'en­
emy combatant' status." Paltrow, supra note 6; cf Mosed Plea Agreement, supra note 3, 'j[ 29 
(waiving "any right" the government has "to detain the defendant as an enemy combatant"); 
Gaba Plea Agreement, supra note 3, 'l[ 29 (same). A more recent account, however, suggests 
that government leverage flowed from the prospect of an additional weapons charge. See 
Purdy & Bergman, supra note 3. 
132. See Government's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Pretrial Mo­
tions, United States v. Sattar, No. 02 Cr. 395 (JGK) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2003) (arguing that 
Stewart provided herself as' personnel to the Islamic Group when she purposefully assisted 
Sheik Omar Ahmad Ali Rahman in circumventing Special Administrative Measures de­
signed to keep Rahman from communicating with his followers). 
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some specific illegal erid; the person's membership status alone pro­
vides sufficient grounds to act. 
C. The Constitutional Boundaries of§ 2339B 
In the remaining pages I assess Cole and Dempsey's criminalized 
association critique of § 2339B in light of the particular characteristics 
of each category of material support described above. I begin with 
funding, and conclude with the reflexive interpretation of personnel. 
1. Funding 
Financial support can of course implicate First Amendment 
considerations, because such support can serve as a proxy for speech 
or as a manifestation of association.133 For this reason, the aspect of § 
2339B that prohibits financial support for DFTOs is subject to some 
degree of First Amendment scrutiny. It does not follow, however, that 
§ 2339B's funding ban triggers the specific intent requirement set forth 
in Scales and other criminalized association cases from the Cold War 
era.134 Those decisions addressed statutes that purposefully targeted 
membership and advocacy. Section 2339B's ban on funding, in con­
trast, burdens First Amendment activity only incidentally. 
The distinction between purposeful and incidental restrictions on 
expression - including expressive association - is crucial because the 
First Amendment demands more from the government when it acts 
purposefully to interfere with expression.135 Translated into doctrinal 
terms, this means that an expression-neutral government action that 
133. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1960) (holding that a statute requiring 
disclosure of organizations to which teachers made contributions implicated the "right of 
free association, a right closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free 
speech, lies at the foundation of a free society"); see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. 
and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985) (holding that a charitable contribution "functions 
as a general expression of support for the recipient and its views"); Buckley v. Valeo, 404 
U.S. 1 ,  21 (1976) (electoral campaign contributions); cf Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 
U.S. 217 (2000) (compelled contribution of student activity fees implicates First Amendment 
interests); Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1 (1990) (compelled contribution of bar association 
dues); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ. , 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (compelled contribution of service 
fee to a union). But see J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?,  85 
YALE L.J. 1001 (1976). Monetary exchanges of course do not always implicate the First 
Amendment. See, e.g. , David Schultz, Revisiting Buckley v. Valeo: Eviscerating the Line 
Between Candidate Contri.butions and Independent Expenditures, 14 J.L. POLITICS 33, 78-79 
(1998). 
134. See supra notes 1 11 - 118 and accompanying text. 
135. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2 (2d ed. 1988); 
Frederick Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Problem of Incidental Restrictions 
on Communications, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 779, 782-85 (1985) (observing that the same 
distinction will not hold true for those who subscribe to what he terms the "positive concep­
tion of the first amendment," which deemphasizes intent and motive and focuses instead on 
impact). 
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only incidentally impacts expression is not subject to strict scrutiny 
with its exacting tailoring requirements. Instead, such action is subject 
to intermediate scrutiny along the lines set forth in United States v. 
O'Brien: 136 the government action must be content-neutral and within 
the government's constitutional authority; it must serve substantial or 
important interests; and it must "not 'burden substantially more 
speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate inter­
ests.' " 137 
First Amendment challenges to economic embargoes of hostile 
foreign states illustrate this point, as Gerald Neuman and Frederick 
Schauer have observed.138 In Teague v. Regional Commissioner 
of Customs, for example, the Second Circuit addressed a First 
Amendment challenge to the "Foreign Asset Control Regulations" 
promulgated pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act, which at 
the time prohibited transactions with China, North Korea, or North 
Vietnam irrespective of one's intent.139 As the Court explained, the 
regulations "were designed to limit the flow of currency to specified 
hostile nations," reflecting the fact that " [h]ard currency is a weapon 
in the struggle between the free and the communist worlds."140 The 
Court acknowledged that the regulations "impinge[d] on first amend­
ment freedoms" by, in this instance, limiting the availability of publi­
cations and films from the designated countries.141 But the Court held 
that this infringement was incidental to the regulations' purpose, and 
therefore concluded that the appropriate level of scrutiny for the 
regulations was that set forth in O'Brien.142 Under that rubric, the 
Court upheld the regulations. 143 
Perhaps more pertinent is the decision in Farrakhan v. Reagan.144 
The Reagan administration had imposed an embargo on Libya in 1986 
in response to a variety of terrorist attacks carried out by Libyan 
136. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
137. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (quoting Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 ,  799 (1989)). 
138. See Gerald L. Neuman, Terrorism, Selective Deportation, and the First Amendment 
After Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 330 (2000); Schauer, supra note 135. 
139. 404 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1968) (citing 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)). The Trading With the 
Enemy Act was supplanted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. 
No. 95-228, 91 Stat. 1 625 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701-1706 (2000)). 
140. Teague, 404 F.2d at 445 (quoting Sardino v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 1 06, 112 
(2d Cir. 1 966) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
14l .  Id. 
142. Id. at 446. 
1 43. Id. ; see also Veterans and Reservists for Peace in Vietnam v. Reg'l Comm'r of Cus­
toms, 459 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1972) (upholding regulations under Trading With the Enemy Act 
against prior restraint challenge). 
144. 669 F. Supp. 506 (D.C. Cir. 1 987). 
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agents, and the effect was "to halt virtually all economic intercourse 
with Libya." 145 Among other things, the embargo prevented the plain­
tiff mosque from repaying a loan from an agency of the Libyan gov­
ernment. The mosque argued that this prohibition, among other 
things, violated their free exercise and free speech rights. The Court 
assumed for the sake of argument that "contributions to Libyan or­
ganizations are a form of symbolic speech," but because the embargo 
impacted such speech only incidentally to its expression-neutral 
purpose of suppressing Libyan sponsorship of terrorism, the Court 
applied intermediate scrutiny pursuant to O'Brien and upheld the 
embargo.146 
Gerald Neuman has correctly argued that the analogy between the 
embargo cases and § 2339B's funding prohibitions is strong.147 In both 
instances, the government has in substance prohibited transactions 
with a foreign entity in furtherance of America's national security and 
foreign policy interests, irrespective of whether a person intends to 
facilitate any harmful conduct by engaging in such transactions.148 The 
two scenarios are technically distinct in the sense that embargoes 
quarantine states, whereas § 2339B quarantines foreign sub-state 
groups. But this is a distinction without a difference for purposes of 
First Amendment law (and for many other purposes, in light of the 
demonstrated capacity of some sub-state entities to inflict harm on a 
scale previously thought possible only for states ) . 149 
145. Farrakhan, 669 F. Supp. at 508. 
146. Id. at 5 12; see also Walsh v. Brady, 927 F.2d 1229, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (applying 
O'Brien in course of upholding Cuban embargo provisions against First Amendment chal­
lenge). 
147. See Neuman, supra note 138, at 330 & n.79. 
148. Cf People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 23 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) (refusing to review substance of DFfO decision by the Secretary of State on justi­
ciability grounds in view of the foreign policy considerations involved); Neuman, supra note 
138, at 331 .  Neuman observes that: 
Id. 
[f]oreign organizations differ from domestic organizations in the degree to which the federal 
government has the capacity to control their actions directly. The United States has limited 
ability to enforce antiterrorist legislation against foreign organizations that are based in 
countries with which the United States has amicable relations, and even less ability to en­
force it against organizations that are based in hostile countries. The federal government 
therefore has fewer alternatives to burdening associational activities as a means of combat­
ing terrorism. 
149. See Neuman, supra note 138, at 331 n.79. 
As Professor Cole points out, the fact that foreign organizations engaged in violence are not 
themselves states provides a potential basis for distinguishing these precedents. Nonstate or­
ganizations, however, can pose threats to the lives of U.S. citizens or to U.S. security inter­
ests as great as those posed by many states, and their overseas location similarly limits the 
ability of the U.S. government to counteract those threats. The analogy therefore appears 
more persuasive than the distinction. 
Id. ; see also David Cole, Damage Control? A Comment on Professor Neuman 's Reading of 
Reno v. AADC, GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 347, 358 (2000). 
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Like the embargoes discussed above, § 2339B 's ban on providing 
funds to DFfOs implicates the O'Brien standard for assessing First 
Amendment challenges to laws which burden expression inciden­
tally.150 And again like the embargoes, § 2339B's funding ban comports 
with that standard. 
As a threshold matter, the funding ban is content-neutral.15 1 Its 
purpose is not to suppress expression or association but instead to 
reduce DFfOs' capacity for political violence, thereby preserving life 
and property and preventing interference with foreign policy goals.152 
As Teague put the point in the embargo context, "restricting the flow 
of information or ideas is not the purpose of the regulations. The 
restriction of First Amendment freedoms is only incidental to the 
proper general purpose of the regulations: restricting the dollar flow to 
hostile nations."153 The next consideration - whether the government 
150. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1 130, 1 134-35 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(citing O'Brien, inter alia, in the course of rejecting freedom of association challenge to § 
'23398); cf Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 58, 81 -82 
(D.D.C. 2002) (applying O 'Brien, in context of free expression argument, to uphold order 
freezing assets of charity for providing financial support to a terrorist group); Global Relief 
Found. Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 806 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (same); Mendelsohn v. 
Meese, 695 F. Supp. 1474, 1482 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (applying O'Brien analysis to a 1987 law 
which barred "the receipt and expenditure of funds from the PLO," reasoning that the law's 
impact on First Amendment interests is incidental); see also Margulies, The Virtues of Vices 
of Solidarity, supra note 126, at 202. Notably, the Seventh Circuit has held that the proper 
doctrinal framework for assessing a First Amendment challenge to § 23398's funding ban is 
provided by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 
1000, 1025-27 (7th Cir. 2002) (upholding the funding ban in the context of a civil action un­
der 18  U.S.C. § 2333 predicated on a §  23398 violation). But as the Ninth Circuit made clear 
in Humanitarian Law Project, application of the O'Brien framework to § 2339B's funding 
ban is entirely consistent with Buckley. See Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1134-35; 
see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov. PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000) (explaining that "re­
strictions on contributions require less compelling justification than restrictions on inde­
pendent spending," that " [i]t has, in any event, been plain ever since Buckley that contribu­
tion limits would more readily clear the hurdles before them," and that even a contribution 
limit that caused significant interference with associational rights could survive if the Gov­
ernment could show the regulation was "closely drawn" to achieve a "sufficiently important 
interest" (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
1 51. See United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 361-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding 
that "§ 2339B's prohibitions are content-neutral and its purpose of deterring and punishing 
the provision of material support or resources to foreign terrorist organizations - a purpose 
aimed not at speech but at conduct - is, of course, legitimate"). 
152. See Neuman, supra note 138, at 330: 
(T]he statute prohibits the conduct of providing funds to designated organizations, and does 
so for the purpose of reducing the organizations' capacity to commit violent acts. It is em­
bedded within a statutory scheme that includes other measures for depriving designated or­
ganizations of U.S. based assets. Arguably then, the prohibition on providing funds should 
be viewed as an incidental burden on First Amendment activity, rather than as a targeted 
regulation of First Amendment activity. 
153. Teague v. Reg'I Comm'r of Customs, 404 F.2d 441 , 445 (2d Cir. 1968); see also 
Baim, 291 F.3d at 1027 (holding that the government's interest in suppressing terrorism pur­
suant to § 23398 and related statutes is "unrelated to suppressing free expression"); cf 
Walsh v. Brady, 927 F.2d 1229, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (observing that "the travel-payment 
restrictions are aimed at denying hard currency to Cuba, rather than at suppressing the re-
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is empowered to enact the law in the first place - is not in serious dis­
pute here. And there is no question that the government's interests in 
this context are sufficiently irnportant. 154 
The real issue is whether § 2339B is a sufficiently tailored means of 
achieving the government's purpose. Put another way, the question is 
whether § 2339B 's funding ban burdens substantially more expressive 
activity than necessary in order to achieve the goal of suppressing 
political violence. 155 
This question goes to the heart of the authors' critique of § 2339B. 
That critique begins from the premise that not all donations to a 
DFTO are intended to be used, or in fact are used, to facilitate terror­
ist acts; some DFTOs after all are hybrid groups engaged in both legal 
and illegal activity.156 A financial contribution to the political/social 
wing of Barnas, they argue, will not necessarily increase the capacities 
of its military wing.157 Cole and Dempsey conclude that the Scales spe-
ceipt of information from or about Cuba, and Walsh does not dispute this point"); Farra­
khan v. Reagan, 669 F. Supp. 506, 510 n. 7 (D.D.C. 1987) (in context of free exercise claim, 
characterizing the nature of the government's interests as concerning national security and 
international terrorism) .  
154. See Boim, 291 F.3d at 1027 ("Applying the Buckley standard to  section 2333 claims 
founded on conduct that would give rise to criminal liability under section 2339B, we con­
clude that the government's interest in preventing terrorism is not only important but para­
mount."); Holy Land Foundation, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 82 (holding that "combating terrorism 
by undermining its financial base" is an "important and substantial government interest"); 
Global Relief Foundation, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 806 (holding that the asset freeze order "pro­
motes an important and substantial government interest - that of preventing terrorist at­
tacks"); Mendelsohn v. Meese, 686 F. Supp. 75, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting that it "is beyond 
argument that the interest of the United States is a compelling one" and that " [t]his interest 
is unrelated to the prevention of free expression"). 
155. As noted above, the means chosen need not be the absolutely least restrictive al­
ternative available. See, e.g. , Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994); 
Walsh, 927 F.2d at 1235. Frederick Schauer has observed that the tailoring requirement of 
O'Brien "seems sometimes not to be applied at all, and sometimes to be applied in different 
ways," and concludes from a review of the decisions that the standard has relatively little 
bite except when an additional First Amendment factor - such as a public forum - is 
involved. Schauer, supra note 135, at 786, 788-89. 
1 56. The authors emphasize the example of Hamas. TERRORISM, p. 120. Hamas devotes 
much of its resources to political and social activities, but of course also has a terrorist 
"wing" or "arm" - the Izz Al-Din Al-Qassem Brigades - which carries out suicide bomb­
ings and other forms of political violence. See YONAH ALEXANDER, PALESTINIAN 
RELIGIOUS TERRORISM: HAMAS AND ISLAMIC JIHAD 1 1-12 (2002). The United States has 
designated Hamas as a whole to be a terrorist organization. See, e.g. , U.S. Dep't of State, 
Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Aug. 9, 2002, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/ 
topical/pol/terror/designated.htm. 
157. Scholars dispute the meaningfulness of alleged distinctions between terrorist 
groups' social and military "wings." See, e.g. , Matthew Levitt, Stemming the Flow of Terrorist 
Financing: Practical and Conceptual Challenges, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Win­
ter/Spring 2003, at 59, 64-66 ("[d]ebunking the Myth of the 'Wings' "); Peter Margulies, Un­
certain Arrivals: Immigration, Terror, and Democracy After September ll ,  2002 UTAH L. 
REV. 481, 506-07 (2002) (stating that "an organization cannot hermetically seal off acts of 
violence against civilians from other aspects of its operations," and noting that humanitarian 
activities by such groups "serve marketing goals" by "lend[ing] organizations that conduct 
terrorist activities a veneer of respectability and religious authority"); cf HEYMANN, supra 
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cific intent requirement therefore is needed to avoid suppressing such 
"innocent" expressive activity (Terrorism, p. 123; Enemy Aliens, pp. 
59-64). 
It is anything but clear, however, that the government's compelling 
interest in reducing political violence by cutting off funding to certain 
foreign organizations could still be achieved if subjected to such a spe­
cific intent requirement.158 The problem is that notwithstanding good 
intentions, donors of financial support cannot actually control how a 
DFfO will spend the money. Even if the donor has the most noble of 
intentions, the money may nonetheless be diverted to violent ends. It 
is perhaps for this reason that when Congress enacted § 2339B, it 
expressly found that "foreign organizations that engage in terrorist 
activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution 
to such an organization facilitates that conduct."159 
In this context, imposition of a specific intent requirement would 
not serve to keep the government from overreaching so much as it 
would prevent the government from achieving its compelling interest 
in cutting off financial support that - intentionally or not - facilitates 
terrorism. Section 2339B 's funding ban therefore does not burden sub­
stantially more expression than necessary to achieve its goals, despite 
its lack of a specific-intent requirement. 
2. Equipment and Services 
Section 2339B bans more than financial contributions, of course. 
As discussed above, it also prohibits the provision of a range of tangi­
ble items and services I have grouped under the headings of "equip­
ment" and "services." Does the ban on providing these forms of sup­
port, irrespective of the donor's intent, implicate First Amendment 
considerations different in kind than those discussed above in the con­
text of financial support? It is difficult to see how this might be. Even 
assuming that the provision of equipment or services to a DFfO 
involves elements of expression or association, the impact of § 2339B 
on such First Amendment interests again would be incidental, and 
note 54, at 97 (acknowledging hybrid nature of some groups, but observing that "it is not too 
much to ask of an organization seeking support for its nonviolent activities that it abandon 
violence as a condition of receiving that support," nor that would-be supporters "find an or­
ganization prepared to further these activities without also using violence"). 
158. See Holy Land Foundation, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 81 (holding that "imposing a 'spe­
cific intent' requirement on the Government's authority to issue blocking orders would sub­
stantially undermine the purpose of the economic sanctions programs," and observing that 
regardless of its intent Holy Land could not control how Hamas uses its donations). For 
much the same reason, the First Amendment would not require a showing of specific intent 
in connection with an embargo of a foreign state. 
159. Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 
301(a)(7), 110  Stat. 1214, 1247 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
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again O'Brien-style intermediate scrutiny would provide the relevant 
analytical framework. 
Section 2339B is analogous in this context to laws such as the 
Export Administration Act160 and the Arms Export Control Act, 161 
which prohibit the export of certain technologies and equipment to 
designated countries. 162 If the government can bar the shipment of 
night vision goggles or the provision of instruction in advanced nuclear 
physics computer technology to North Korea, it would seem it could 
equally prevent the same with respect to a hostile foreign group such 
as Hezbollah. In light of the harm that might ensue from such ship­
ments, it matters not at all how the donor or provider intends for the 
equipment or services to be used. 163 What does matter is that the ban is 
not enacted in order to interfere with First Amendment activity, but 
instead to achieve unrelated goals of foreign and national security 
policy.164 
3. The Reflexive Interpretation of Personnel 
In the preceding pages I have argued that the guilt by association 
critique of § 2339B mistakenly collapses the distinction between gov-
160. See 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (2000). The export-control regime of the Export 
Administration Act has been extended by Executive Order pursuant to the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (2000). See Exec. Order No. 
13,222, 66 Fed. Reg. 44,025 (Aug. 17, 2001) as extended by the Notice of August 14, 2002, 67 
Fed. Reg. 53,721 (Aug. 14, 2002). 
161. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2000). 
162. Section 2339B in this respect also parallels 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(l) (2000), which ren­
ders it illegal for a licensed firearm dealer, importer, manufacturer, or collector to provide a 
firearm to a minor. It is no defense to a violation of this law that the provider did not intend 
for the minor to use the firearm to commit a crime or otherwise use it in a harmful manner, 
and no such defense would be available even if a provider had an expressive interest of some 
sort in this particular conduct. 
163. See, e.g., United States v. Shetterly, 971 F.2d 67, 73 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that the 
Export Administration Act requires only an intent to export proscribed items in violation of 
the statute); United States v. Frade, 709 F.2d 1387, 1391 ( 1 1th Cir. 1983) (same). 
164. The equipment category does have a flaw, albeit not one related to the 
criminalized-association argument. The problem is one of drafting, and it follows from the 
decision to incorporate § 2339A's definition of "material support" into § 2339B. In the 
context of § 2339A the drafters had every incentive to cast the "material support" net as 
widely as possible in hopes of encompassing unanticipated forms, because that statute re­
quires proof of the supporter's intent to facilitate a criminal act. Thus the definition includes 
not just weapons and cash but, also, "other physical assets." Section 2339B incorporates this 
sweeping term but, as we know, does not cabin it with a corresponding intent requirement. 
As a result, critics of the law are able to point to absurd but technically possible hypothetical 
scenarios such as the deportation of an immigrant for sending a "toy train set to a day-care 
center run by" a DFTO. See Cole, Enemy Aliens, supra note 1 5, at 967. While it is quite pos­
sible if not likely that a reviewing court would interpret the term "other physical assets" to 
reach only items which reasonably could be diverted or converted to harmful uses, this ap­
proach might in turn raise a question of vagueness. Accordingly, Congress would be well­
advised to provide § 2339B with its own definition of "material support," replacing "other 
physical assets" with more specific descriptions. 
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ernment action which purposefully infringes First Amendment rights 
and action which does so only incidentally. On its face, § 2339B is the 
latter type of statute. But there is one limited respect in which § 2339B 
does appear to interfere purposefully with First Amendment activity. 
The definition of prohibited material support includes the provision of 
personnel, and as noted above the government has taken the position 
in litigation and in its own internal guidelines that this includes 
providing one's self as personnel. 
The reflexive interpretation of personnel in substance criminalizes 
at least some forms of membership in a DFTO. This aspect of § 2339B 
thus is different in kind from the statute's other prohibitions, none of 
which purposefully limit expression or association. The ban on pro­
viding one's self as personnel thus seems at first blush to fall squarely 
within the rule of Scales and other anticommunist cases dealing with 
statutes that similarly prohibited association with dangerous groups. 
The government, not insensitive to this possibility, takes the posi­
tion that "personnel" should be understood to reach only the subset of 
association in which one is not merely a nominal member of a group 
but a quasi-employee subject to the DFTO's direction or control.165 
Understood this way, § 2339B punishes the conduct of providing a 
human resource to the DFTO, while leaving ample opportunity for 
those who wish to do so to express symboiically their support for the 
group through nominal affiliation or independent advocacy. 
This argument has been met with approval by two of the three 
courts to have confronted it since 9/11 . 1 66 In the prosecution of John 
Walker Lindh, for example, the district judge held that "the plain 
meaning of 'personnel' is such that it requires . . .  an employment or 
employment-like relationship between the persons in question and the 
[DFT0]." 1 67 This interpretation, the judge explained, did not foreclose 
membership in a DFTO: "One can become a member of a political 
party without also becoming a part of its 'personnel.' " 168 Relying on 
the Lindh decision, moreover, the magistrate judge in the Lackawanna 
case went a step further, holding that "one can be found to have 'pro­
vided material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization' 
by offering one's self to be indoctrinated and trained as a 'resource' in 
that organization's beliefs and activities. " 1 69 In contrast, the district 
court in the Lynne Stewart prosecution refused to consider the gov-
165. See U.S. ATIORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 127, § 9-91 . 100; United States v. Sattar, 
272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 358-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. 
Sattar, No. 02 Cr. 395 (JGK), at 55-56 (June 13, 2003) [hereinafter Stewart Transcript), 
available at http://www.lynnestewart.org/ReportJune13Hearing.pdf. 
166. But see Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F. 3d 1 130, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2000). 
167. See United States v. Lindh, F. Supp. 3d 541 , 574 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
168. Id. at 572. 
169. Gaba I, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 194. 
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ernment's "direction or control" interpretation on the ground that it 
was not part of the statute, and accordingly held that the term "per­
sonnel" is unconstitutionally vague.170 
But even assuming it is correct that the direction or control limita­
tion preserves space for nominal membership in a DFTO, the question 
remains whether the First Amendment tolerates direct suppression of 
more substantial forms of association absent proof of knowledge or 
intent. The beginnings of an answer are in Scales. One of the threshold 
issues in that case was whether the statute's membership provision 
punished mere nominal membership in communist organizations. 17 1  
The Court resolved this question by construing the statute to exclude 
nominal membership and to reach only "active" members of the 
organization with knowledge of the group's illegal purposes. 172 But 
even after thus limiting the statute's scope to the subset of active 
members, the Court still held that the statute must be construed to 
contain an intent requirement insofar far as it criminalized associa­
tion.173 
When a statute premises criminal punishment on membership 
status alone, then, it does not matter for First Amendment purposes 
whether that punishment is limited to a subset of the persons associ­
ated with that group. Whatever subset is selected, heightened First 
Amendment concerns arise when the punishment targets association 
rather than, say, conduct along the lines of providing financial support, 
equipment, or services to the group. As the Court in Scales wrote, 
there is "a real danger that legitimate political expression or associa­
tion would be impaired" if the government were permitted to punish 
acts of pure association without proof of a specific intent to further an 
organization's illegal goals. 174 
None of this is to say, of course, that the government cannot 
punish membership in a DFTO under any circumstances.175 And natu-
170. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 359. In so holding, the court followed the pre-9/11 deci-
sion by the Ninth Circuit in Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F. 3d at 1 137-38. 
171. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 209 (1961). 
172. See id. 
173. See id. at 222-30; supra notes 1 12-1 18 and accompanying text. 
174. See Scales, 367 U.S. at 229. 
1 75 .  This is particularly true of DFTOs such as Al Qaeda which have little or no legiti­
mate functions. ENEMY ALIENS, p. 63. In such instances, Cole argues, it should prove rela­
tively easy to establish that one who became a member of the DFTO did so with knowledge 
of its illicit activities and an intent to further them. ENEMY ALIENS, p. 63. Cole repeats this 
point in The New McCarthyism, supra note 15, at 14: 
An organization like Al Qaeda may present a special case, for it does not appear to have le­
gal purposes at all. Unlike, say. the Irish Republican Army, the Palestinian Liberation Or­
ganization, or the ANC, groups with political agendas that use violent means among many 
others, Al Qaeda appears to do little more than plot, train for, and conduct terrorism. But if 
that is the case, we do not need guilt by association. It  ought to be relatively simple to estab-
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rally a DFfO member who provides services, equipment, o r  funding 
to the group will be independently subject to prosecution under § 
2339B without respect . to . .  that person's membership status. But 
assuming that as a society we continue to hold . with the First Amend­
ment values expressed in Scales, prosecutions based solely on a per­
son's status as a member of a DFfO must comport with Scales's intent 
requirement.176 
Do we as a society continue to hold such values? The pathological 
perspective suggests that we are fair-weather friends to civil liberties, 
that we readily abandon them in times of perceived crisis. To the 
extent we currently are in the midst of such a period, then as Mark 
Tushnet has predicted, "we can expect courts to uphold [§ 2339B] 
convictions in the face of claims that the government failed to show 
that the defendant shared the illegal goals. And, we can expect that 
several years later, courts will begin to require such a demonstration 
from the government. "177 
If this prediction comes to pass, then the short duration of § 
2339B's flirtation with constitutional boundaries could be interpreted 
as a testament to the continuing vitality of civil liberty protections 
entrenched in the Cold War era. That outcome would endorse the 
social-learning model, particularly if in the process courts further 
refine our understanding of the permissible limits of criminalized asso­
ciation. If, on the other hand, the reflexive interpretation of personnel 
survives in its present form178 - or expands179 - then some civil liber-
lish that when an individual affirmatively supports Al Qaeda, he intends to support its ter­
rorist ends, because Al Qaeda has few if any other ends. 
176. The government conceded this point, albeit temporarily, in recent litigation. Dur­
ing oral argument on the defendants' motion to dismiss the material support charges in the 
Lynne Stewart case, the judge questioned prosecutors about the extent to which the "per­
sonnel" provision would preclude a DFTO from being able to retain an attorney. Counsel 
for the government responded that, 
[i]t may be, your Honor, that in such instances. the Court needs to apply a heightened level 
of scienter for certain aspects of the statute like perhaps personnel, in other words, to show 
an intent on the behalf of the attorney to further the illegal objectives of the terrorist organi­
zation. 
See Stewart Transcript, supra note 165, at 59-60. Subsequently, however, the government 
submitted a letter to the court withdrawing this concession. See Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 360 
(citing letter of the United States dated June 27, 2003, at 3 n.3). 
177. Tushnet, sup;a note 41, at 293. 
178. Testifying before the House Judiciary Committee in June 2003, Attorney General 
Ashcroft urged Congress to make clear that "going and joining the operation is providing 
material support." The Justice Department and the USA PATRIOT Act: Hearing Before the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2003) (oral testimony of Attorney General 
John Ashcroft), available at 2003 WL 21291138. It is unclear whether Attorney General 
Ashcroft meant by these words to advocate criminal liability for membership absent intent, 
however, given that he also stated that "we need for the law to make it clear that it's just as 
much a conspiracy to aid and assist the terrorist to go and fight - to join them for fighting 
purposes, as it is to carry them a lunch or to provide them a weapon."  Id. (oral testimony of 
Attorney General John Ashcroft) (emphasis added). 
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ties gains of the past will have been lost in much the same m�nner as 
Cole predicts in Enemy Aliens. By the same token, the resulting 
expansion of criminalized association principles would exacerbate the 
concerns expressed by Cole and Dempsey in Terrorism and the 
Constitution regarding the chilling effect of government investigations 
on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms; insofar as membership 
in a DFTO itself is illegal, the extent to which investigations will focus 
on advocacy as an indicia of membership will grow. It would, on the 
whole, be an unfortunate fulfillment of the pessimistic predictions of 
the adaptive-learning model.180 
* * * 
In many respects, the story of § 2339B and the guilt by association 
critique symbolizes the tensions raised by the post-9/11 adoption of a 
terrorism prevention paradigm. The material support law is in most 
respects a sensible tool for achieving prevention, but as discussed 
above it also has opened a window for a more direct form of preven­
tion, and this raises significant civil liberties concerns. That window is 
small for now, but it ·could open wider. Whether that happens, or if 
instead the courts close it, will speak volumes about the staying power 
of existing civil liberties protections during times of crisis, and there­
fore about the relative merits of the social-learning and adaptive­
learning models. 
179. The Justice Department may be contemplating an expansion of the range of asso­
ciation captured by the reflexive interpretation of "personnel." In February 2003, a draft 
Justice Department proposal for new antiterrorism Jaws titled the "Domestic Security 
Enhancement Act of 2003" ("DSEA'') was leaked to the public. Immediately tagged 
"PATRIOT I I," the draft drew a significant amount of comments and criticisms. But few if 
any paid attention to § 402 of the DSEA, which if adopted would amend § 2339B to provide 
that 
no person may be prosecuted under this section in connection with the term "personnel" 
unless that person has knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired to provide a 
terrorist organization with one or more individuals (which may be or include himself) to 
work in concert with the organization or under its direction or control. 
Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, § 402 (Draft) (Jan. 9, 2003) (emphasis added), 
available at http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/patriot2-hi.pdf. Adding the phrase "work in 
concert with" as an alternative predicate to "under its direction or control" would of course 
capture a larger slice of association than the latter alone. 
180. Then again, either result would be equally consistent with the view expressed by 
Posner and Vermeule to the effect that "there just are no systematic trends in the history of 
civil liberties, no important ratchet-like mechanisms that cause repeated wars or emergen­
cies to push civil liberties in one direction or another in any sustained fashion." Posner & 
Vermeule, supra note 1 7  (manuscript at 16). 
